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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DANIEL S. FUCHS, Licensee, dba 
AUBREY'S HOUSE OF ALE, 
Case No. 
v. 
Appellant/Petitioner, NOTICE OF APPEAL/PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
IDAHO ST A TE POLICE, 
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
Respondent. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, ITS ATTORNEYS, AND THE DIRECTOR 
OF THE IDAHO ST ATE POLICE. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT Appellant/Petitioner, DANIEL S. FUCHS, by and 
through his attorney of record, BRIAN DONESLEY, hereby appeals and petitions the District 
Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai for 
judicial review of the Director's Final Order issued by the Director of the Idaho State Police on 
June 8, 2010 in Idaho State Police, Alcohol Beverage Control v. Daniel S. Fuchs, Licensee, dba, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL/PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW O R1 c lk'A L 
Daniel Fuchs VS ISP sct~;~~;~~~~.'-il..U • J JLU\1L i it'u l-~i~6 o,1~ 
Aubrey's House of Ale, Hearing No. 08ABC-COM112, License No. 7323.0, Premise No. K-
7323. 
This Petition for Judicial Review is commenced pursuant to and in accordance with the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, I.C. § 67- 5201, et seq. 
I. 
JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
1. Judicial review is sought, pursuant to I.C. § 67-5270 and Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 84, from the Director's Final Order of the Director of the Idaho State Po lice issued on 
June 8, 2010, 
2. This Petition is taken to the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai. The District Court has statutory authority, pursuant 
to I.C. § 67-5279, to affirm the Director's Final Order or to set aside and remand the matter upon 
the grounds that the Final Order is: 
a) In violation of constitutional and statutory provisions; 
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) Made upon unlawful procedure, 
(d) Not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
( e) Arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. 
3. On October 23. 2008, Idaho State Police, Alcohol Beverage Control 
("ISP/ABC"), filed a Complaint for Forfeiture or Revocation of Retail Alcohol Beverage License 
against Daniel S. Fuchs, Licensee, dba, Aubrey's House of Ale. On November 18, 2009, the 
Hearing Officer, Michael E. Kelley, presided over a hearing on cross motions for summary 
judgment. On December 24, 2009, the Hearing Officer entered his Preliminary Order on 
Motions for Summary Judgment and Order on Complainant's Renewed Motionfor Protective 
NOTICE OF APPEAL/PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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Order. finding that there was no genuine material issue of disputed facts and that as a matter of 
law Fuchs was entitled to summary judgment. On February 2, 2010, ISP/ABC filed its Petition 
fo;- Review with the Director of the Idaho State Police. The oral argument before the Hearing 
Officer was taken by stenographic means and has not yet been transcribed. There was no oral 
argument before the Director. All records of this administrative proceeding are in the possession 
of the Director of the Idaho State Police, 700 S. Stratford Drive, Meridian Idaho, 83642-6202. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Petitioner seeks judicial review of all issues as provided for in J.C. § 67-5279, including, 
but not limited to each and every of the following: 
1. Whether the Director erred as a matter of law. where. having determined that 
IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 was ambiguous a matter of law, he determined that the ambiguity be 
construed in favor of ISP/ ABC, the agency that drafted the rule; 
(a) The Director erred because IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 was unambiguous as 
a matter of law and should have been interpreted and enforced in a manner 
consistent with long-time agency practice; or, 
(b) Alternatively, if IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 is determined to be ambiguous, 
the rule is void and/or all ambiguities must be construed against the agency that 
drafted and promulgated the rule; 
2. Whether the administrative actions of ISP/ABC violated the Idaho Constitution, 
Article IIL Section 24 and other Idaho and United States constitutional provisions and exceeded 
the authority granted to it under LC. § 23-908 ( 4) and other applicable law; 
3. Whether the Director erred, based on the grounds that the administrative actions 
of ABC were based upon unlawful procedure. ABC's new requirement that licensees make 
NOTICE OF APPEAL/PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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multiple hourly actual sales within the first six months was a new "Rule" as defined by I.C. § 67-
5201 (19). This new rule was implemented, but not properly promulgated, in violation of 
IDAPA, l.C. §§ 67-5206-523 l and other applicable law; 
4. Whether the Director erred based on the grounds that ABC's administrative 
actions were arbitrary and unreasonable exercises of police power in violation of the United 
States and Idaho Constitutions; 
5. Whether the Director erred based on the grounds that ABC was barred under the 
doctrine of quasi-estoppel from taking inconsistent positions where Petitioner relied on ABC's 
previous positions to his detriment; 
6. Whether the Director erred by not setting aside the Hearing Officer's exclusion of 
the testimony of Petitioner's counsel and then making factual findings based upon evidence 
submitted by counsel; 
7. Whether Petitioner is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 
l.C. § 12-117, incurred in defending the administrative action filed by ISP/ABC, because 
ISP/ABC's pursuit of forfeiture or revocation of his retail alcohol beverage license had no 
reasonable basis in law or fact; 
8. Whether the administrative actions were otherwise: 
(a) In violation of constitutional and/or statutory provisions; 
(b) ln excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) Not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; and/or 
( e) Arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 
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III. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Court set aside and remand the Final 
Order issued by the Director of the Idaho State Police denying attorneys fees and costs based 
upon the grounds that: 
1) IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 is unambiguous as a matter of law and does not 
require that new liquor licensees to make actual sales of liquor by the drink in 
the first six months; or, 
2) Alternatively, that IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 is ambiguous as a matter of law 
and therefore is void or must be construed against the agency that drafted and 
promulgated it; 
3) That ABC's new interpretation of IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 violates the Idaho 
Constitution, Article III, Section 24 and exceeds the authority granted to it 
under I.C. § 23-908 ( 4 ); 
4) That ABC is prohibited under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel from taking 
inconsistent positions to Petitioner's detriment; 
5) That ABC's new interpretation ofIDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 was a new rule not 
promulgated in accordance with and in violation of LC. § 67-5201 et seq.; 
6) That ABC's enforcement of IDAPA 11.05.01.0l 0.03 is an arbitrary an 
unreasonable exercise of police power; 
7) That the Director erred by not setting aside the Hearing Officer's exclusion of 
the testimony of Petitioner's counsel and then making factual findings based 
upon evidence submitted by counsel; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL/PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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8) That Petitioner be awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to the provisions of 
Idaho law including, but not limited to, Idaho Code §§ 12-117, 121 and Rule 
54(e) (I), l.R.C.P, and other applicable law; 
9) Appellant requests a reporter's transcript and the full evidentiary record, 
including all exhibits, of the hearing on the cross motions for summary 
judgment before the Hearing Officer; 
I 0) Appellant requests that the following documents be included in the agency 
record: all documents filed with the Hearing Officer associated with the 
hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment and all documents filed 
with the Director of the Idaho State Police associated with the Petition for 
Review filed by Idaho State Police, Alcohol Beverage Control on February 2, 
2010; 
11) I hereby certify: 
(a) That service of this Appeal/Petition for Judicial Review has been made upon 
the Director of the Idaho State Police; 
(b) That the Secretary/Clerk of the Director of the Idaho State Police shall be 
paid the estimated fee for preparation of the transcript within the time 
required by rule after notice to Appellant of the amount of the estimated fee; 
( c) That the Secretary/Clerk of the Director of the Idaho State Police shall be 
paid the estimated fee for preparation of the record within the time required 
by rule after notice to Appell7?.the amount~of the estimated fee. 
'L1,__ ,-
DATED this __ day ofJune, 2010. , r"' ( 
\ ~G..1..,._ ~ \......es ~) 
Brian Donesley 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~day of June, 2010, I caused an accurate copy of 
the foregoing document to be delivered as noted below to: 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General 
Stephanie A. Altig, Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, Idaho 83642-6202 
Facsimile: 208-884-7228 
Lt. Robert Clements, Bureau Manager 
Alcohol Beverage Control 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, Idaho 83642-6202 
Facsimile: 208-884-7096 
Colonel G. Jerry Russell 
Director, Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a Petition for Judicial Review of a Final Order by the Director of the Idaho State 
Police ("ISP"), wherein the Director denied Petitio:ner Daniel S. Fuchs' ("Fuchs") motion for 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C.§ 12-117. The Director denied Fuchs' fees, even though Fuchs was 
the prevailing party in the administrative proceeding, and Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau of 
Idaho State Police ("ISP ABC") pursued the action without a reasonable basis in fact or law.1 In 
fact, though Fuchs obtained the result he sought in the action, dismissal of the forfeiture and/or 
revocation proceedings with no sanction, the Director ordered that Fuchs was not the prevailing 
party. The Director's Final Order was a clear effort to avoid an award of attorney fees. But his 
decision only compounded the errors of his agency in this matter and further underscores that 
fees should be awarded to Fuchs. 
The administrative proceeding centered on the interpretation ofI.C. § 23-908 (4) and 
IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 ("Rule 10.03" or the "New Licenses rule"). I.C. § 23-908 (4) requires 
new liquor licensees, who have been recently issued licenses off of a priority list, to put the 
license into "actual use" and that the license remain in "actual use" for the first six months after 
the license was issued. Rule 10.03, an administrative rule promulgated by ABC in 1993, 
provides that the "actual use" requirement ofl.C. § 23-908 (4) is satisfied, if the licensee makes 
"actual sales'' ofliquor by the drink during at least eight (8) hours per day, no fewer than six (6) 
clays per week." For fifteen (15) years, and for accepted public policy reasons, ISP interpreted 
the mle judiciously and liberally, yet in a manner consistent with public policy. However, jn 
2008, ABC filed the administrative complaint against Fuchs, clairrring that he did not make a 
1 ABC, a bureau within the Department of Idaho State Police, has been delegated by the Director, the "authority for 
the licensing of establishments which sell alcoholic beverages, as contained in Title 23, Chapters 9, 10, and 13, 
Idaho Code." IPAPA 11.05.01.011.02. The Director retains "supetvisory authority for alcoholic beverage 
licensing." Id. 
Daniel Fuchs vs ISP SC 38714-2011 
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sufficient number of "actual sales." During the cow-se of the proceedings, ABC declared that 
the rule strictly required multiple hourly sales for eight (8) hours a day, six (6) days a week. 
The Director, below, ruled that Rule 10.03 was ambiguous, capable of being interpreted 
three ways. The Director then proceeded to announce his new interpretation of Rule 10.03, 
disregarding fifteen (15) years of prior agency enforcement of the rule, rejecting ABC's 
previously unquestioned, historial interpretation, and rejecting the Hearing Officer's 
interpretation. The Director then declared that Fuchs had violated Rule 10.03. But he <lid not 
sanction Fuchs because of the "confusion'' regarding the rule's interpretation. He also examined 
other issues in the case by dicta, stating that ISP is not barred by quasi-estoppel, did not engage 
in improper rulcmaking, and did not engage in an unreasonable exercise of police power. The 
Director denied fees to either party. 
The Director erred by not awarding fees to Fuchs under I.e. § 12-117. Fuchs was the 
prevailing party, as he obtained the result he sought, the Director holding that Rule 10.03 was 
ambiguous, and dismissal of the administrative action. 
Further, ISP's actions, throughout these proceedings, have been without reasonable basis 
in fact or law. The interpretation of Rule 10.03 through this case has been a moving target. 
There have been five separate agency interpretations of the rule presented on the record since 
this proceeding began. 
Fuchs should not bear the financial burden of correcting the State's mistakes that never 
should have been made. Alternatively, if this Court deems it necessary to reach the merits, Rule 
10.03 does not require "actual sales." The rule is ambiguous. All ambiguities must be construed 
against the agency that drafted it. Further, ISP is barred by quasi-estoppel from taking such 
inconsisLent positions. And it engaged in improper rulcmaking. Moreover, it has engaged in an 
Daniel Fuchs vs ISP SC 38714-2011 
APPELLANT'S BRJEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Page 17 of 132 
Page3 of34 
10/15/2010 14: 29 20834341 PAGE 08/38 
unreasonable exercise of police power. 
This Court should reverse the Director's Final Order and award attorney fees to Fuc:hs 
pun;uanL tol.C. § 12-117. 
n. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS2 
In 1980, the Idaho Legislature amended the Idaho Code, requiring new liquor licensees 
put their licenses into "actual use" at the time of issuance and keep them in ''use" for at least six 
(6) months. I.C. § 23-908 (4). 
In 1993, ISP/ABC promulgated IDAPA l l.0S.01.010.03 ("Rule 10.03" or "New Licenses 
Rule"), by which a new licensee may satisfy the "actual use" requirements ofI.C. § 23-908 (4). 
This rule states in relevant part: 
The requirement of Section 23-908( 4 ), Idaho Code, that a new l1c:ense be placed 
into actual use by the licensee and remain in use for at least six (6) consecutive 
months is satisfied if the licensee makes actual sales of liquor by the drink during 
at least eight (8) hours per day, no fewer than six (6) days per week. 
IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 
In 2003, ISP/ABC offered four new licenses to Fuchs in Nampa, Idaho. (Fuchs Aff.; 
Exhibit R·DF·l). Fuchs was told by ISP/ABC that he was not required to make actual sales. 
But he was required to have liquor available for sale during at least eight (8) hours a day, no 
fewer than six (6) days a week. (Denise Rogers Aff. at ,r 4). Subsequently, Fuchs was issued the 
four new licenses. (Fuchs Aff.; Exhibits l, 3, 4, 5). Fuchs made fewer sales at these premises 
than is at issue horc. (Donesley Aff. Exhibit R-4). Although ISP/ABC was aware of how many 
sales Fuchs made at each of the four licensed premises, ISP/ ABC did not issue an administrative 
notice violation to Fuchs alleging that he failed to make "actual sales." (Exhibit R-4; Fuchs 
• The Statement of Undisputed Facts contained herein is a brief summary. for a complete recitation, Fuchs refers 
th.i11 Court to the Statement of Undisputed Facts set fottb in Respondent's Brief on Review by Agency Head, pp. 6-
15. 
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Aff., Exhibit R-DF-6). 
On May 19, 2008, Fuchs applied for a state liquor license for the City of Coeur d'Alene. 
(Fuchs Afr.; Exhibit R-DF-8). On June 6, 2008, ISP/ABC issued an Idaho Retail Alcohol 
Beverage License to Fuchs. (Fuchs Aff.; Exhibit R-DF-16). 
Fuchs leased space at 2065 West Riverstone Drive, # 207 in Coeur d'Alene and obtained 
all necessary licenses and permits required by other state and local agencies. (Fuchs Mf.; 
Exhibits R-DF-7, 10-12). Fuchs employed staff and obtained unemployment and workers 
compensation insurance. (Fuchs Aff.; Exhibits R-DF-13, 14, 1S). Since the license was issued, 
Fuchs' premise has been named Aubrey's House of Ale ("Aubrey's), and it has remained open 
each Monday through Saturday, from 10:00 am to 6:00 pm. (Fuchs Aff. at, 13). 
On September 16, 2008, Lt. Clements, ABC Bureau Chief, conducted an unannounced 
inspection of Aubrey's. Lt. Clements met with Ruth Purvis, Fuchs' employee. He observed no 
customers. Purvis showed Lt. Clements the liquor and beer supply which was available for sale 
to the public. 
Upon request by Lt. Clements, Fuchs produced copies of sales records for Aubrey's for 
the months of June 2008 through September 2008. Aubrey's had generated sales for each month 
that it has been open. Fuchs reported sales of $598.11 to the Idaho Tax Commission for the 
period from July 1, 2008 to September 30, 2008 for Aubrey's. Fuchs Aff.; Exhibits R-DF-17-
18). 
On October 14, 2008, ISP/ABC issued an administrative notice violation alleging the 
license was not properly being used. (Complaint for Forfeiture or Revocation of Retail Alcohol 
Beverage License). 
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m. 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS 
1. Proceedings before tbe Hearing Officer. 
On October 23, 2008, ABC filed its Complaint for Forfeiture or Revocation of Retail 
Alcohol Beverage License. Following extensive discovery, the parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment on October 9, 2009. Upon oral argument, the Hearing Officer issued bis 
Preliminary Order on December 24, 2009, granting summary judgment to Fuchs. 
The Hearing·Of.ticer ruled that IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 unambiguously required a new 
licensee to make actual sales of liquor by the drink sometime while in operation for eight (8) 
hours a day/no fewer than six (6) days a week: 
The rule promulgated by the Complainant to satisfy the "actual use" language of 
Idaho Code§ 23-908 (4) unequivocally states that the requirement of Idaho Code 
§ 23-908 (4) that a new license be placed into actual use by a licensee and remain 
used for six consecutive months is satisfied if the licensee makes actual sale of 
liquor by the drink during at least eight hours per day and no fewer that six days 
per week. Contrary to the emphasis placed on other phrases and words within the 
regulation by the parties, it would appear that applying the plain, obvious and 
literal meaning to the word "during" would satisfy any inquiry into whether 
IDAPA ll.0S.01.010.03 is ambiguous or unambiguous. 
The definition of "during, '' inter aiia, is "throughout the duration of" The 
definition of "duration" iS "che time during which ,omething exists or lasts." 
Thus, it would appear a licensee would be required to make actual sales of liquor 
by the drink sometime while it is in operation for eight hours a day/no fewer than 
six days a week. Applying this interpretation to the undisputed facts, the evidence 
shows that while sales of liquor by the glass by the Respondent at Aubref s are 
spotty at best, sales have nevertheless taken place. (underline in original, italics 
added). 
Preliminary Order on Motions for Summary Judgment and Order on Complainant' 
Renewed Motion for Protective Order at 15-16 ("Preliminary Order"). 
The Hearing Officer also determined that ABC was barred under the doctrine of quasi-
estoppel, since "the Complainant is now taking inconsistent positions of its past practices 
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regarding requirements of new liquor licensees." Preliminary Order at 18. 
Fuchs also had moved for summary judgment on whether ABC's new policy was 
improper rulemaking and an arbitrary· ari.d unreasonable exercise of police power. 
Notwithstanding, the Hearing Officer held that, because his ruling on the interpretation of the 
rule was dispositive, the remaining issues "were moot." Preliminary Order at 19. n.6. 
The Hearing Officer did not award attorney foes lo Fuchs, because, based upon the law at 
the time, he had no authority to do so: 
Both parties have sought attorney fees in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
117 and other applicable statutes and rules. Under Idaho Code § 12-117 only the 
court and not an administrative officer or agency can award attorney fees to a 
prevailing party. See, Rammell v. Idaho State Department of Agriculture, 147 
Idaho 415 (2009). As such, no attorney fees are awarded. 
Preliminary Order at 19. 
In Rammell, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled its previous decisions and held, as the 
Hearing Officer observed, that only courts were authorized to award attorney fees under l.C.§ 
12-117 On March 3, 2010, the Idaho Legislature amended I.C. § ,12-117 to expressly provide 
that administrative officers and agencies could award attorney fees. House Bill 421, SIXTIETH 
LEGISLATURE, SECOND REGULAR SESSION, 2010. It further provided that the legislation would 
have retroactive effect: ''this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and 
approval, and retroactively to May 31, 2009 and shall apply to all cases filed and pending as of 
June 1, 2009." Section 2, House Bill 421, SIXTIETH LEGISLATURE, SECOND REGULAR S~SSION, 
2010. 
2. ABC's Petition for Review by Agency Head. 
ABC appealed the Hearing Officer's Decision to the Director of the Idaho State Police. 
On June 8, 2010, the Director issued his Final Order, declaring that Rule 10.03 was ambiguous, 
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and announcing his own interpretation: 
The Hearing Officer's Interpretation of Rule 10.03 is clearly incorrect. However, 
this does not automatically dictate that ABC's interpretation is correct. 
Examining the language of the rule, reasonable minds can reach different 
conclusions regarding its precise meaning. In other words, it is ambiguous. The 
rule can reasonably be read one (1) of three (3) ways. A licensee must: 
a. sell at least one (1) glass of liquor every hour for at least eight (8) hours, 
six (6) days or more a week. (This would require at least forty-eight) 48 
sales a week and is how ABC is apparently interpreting the rule); or 
b. sell at least one (1) glass of liquor sometime during every day that the 
establishment is open. The establishment must be open for at lest eight (8) 
hours per day, six (6) days or more a week. (This would require at least (6) 
sales a week); or 
c. sell at least one (1) glass of liquor sometime during a period of time 
during which the establishment is open at least eight hours a day, at least six 
(6) days a week (this would require only {l) sale a week). 
The proper interpretation of ID.APA 11.05.01.010.03 is that a new licensee must 
sell at least one (1) glass of liquor sometime during every day that the 
establishment is open. Toe establishment must be open for at least eight (8) hours 
per day, sis ( 6) days a week. 
Director's Final Order at 10-11. 
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Additionally, the Director. held that ABC was not barred from taking inconsistent 
positions under quasi-estoppel, stating incongruously that "there is no question that Fuchs 
violated Rule 10.03." Director's Final Order at 12. 
Further, the Director ruled that ABC did not engage in improper rulemaking, because 
''ABC's notifications to Fuchs (including the interpretation adopted by the Director and stated in 
this Final Decision) qualify as written statements from the agency to the licensee pertaining to 
how the agency is interpreting Rule 10.03." Director's Final Order at 15. He held that ABC's 
actions were not arbitrary and wireasonable, because Rule 10.03 requires "actual sales," and ··'the 
only thing ambiguous about the rule was whether those actual sales have to be hourly, daily or 
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weekly.0 Id. at 16. 
Despite such curious pronouncements, the Director did not order revocation or forfeiture 
of Fuchs' license, though, ostensibly1 be had ruled against Fuchs on each issue: 
The record shows that Fuchs violated IDA.PA ll .0S.01.010.03 by failing to make 
the necessary sales on numerous days and even several entire weeks during the 
relevant six (6) month period. However, given the confusion over the proper 
interpretation of the rule and its misapplication by both parties and the Hearing 
Officer, Fuchs will not be sanctioned for this violation, and the clarification of the 
proper interpretation oflDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 set forth in this Final Order shall 
have prospective effect only. 
Id. at 18. 
The Director refused to award auomey fees to either party, stating that neither party 
prevailed and that Fuchs bad not acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Under Idaho Code§ 12-117, an administrative agency shall award attorney fees to 
the prevailing party, but only when the losing party "acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law." In this case, the Director has reversed the Hearing Officer's 
Preliminary Order and found that Fuchs violated the applicable rule. Therefore, 
Fuchs is not the prevailing party and is not eligfble for attomey fees under Section 
12·117. However, neither is ABC. While the Director has concluded that Fuchs 
violated IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03, it cannot be said that he acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The rule at issue in this case is ambiguous. Prior ISP administrators, the Hearing 
Officer, and both parties misinterpreted. what the rule requires. Although Fuchs 
was properly put on advanced notice that actual sales were necessary, there was 
still considcmble confusion over the exact details of those sales. 
Id. at 17. 
On July 1, 2010, Fuchs filed a timely Notice of Appeal/Petition for Judicial Review with 
this Court seeking co1>-ts and attorney fees ... 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An agency's action may be set aside if the agency's findings, conclusions, or decisions (a) 
violate constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; ( c) are 
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made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3). In addition, 
Idaho courts will affinn an agency acLion unless a substantial right of the appellant has been 
prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279(4). 
An award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 bas been distilled into a two-part test: fees 
must be awarded, if (l) the Court finds in favor of the person, and (2) the agency acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Reardon v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115, 118, (2004). 
V. 
THIS COURT SHOULD OVERRULE THE DIRECTOR'S DENIAL OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY FEES AND ORDER COSTS AND ATTO.RNt:Y FEES TO FUCHS 
UND.ERI.C. § 12-117, FUCHS IS THE PREVAil..ING PARTY. THE RULE WAS 
FOUND TO BE AMBIGUOUS, HENCE, VOID, nus RULING CONTROLS AND 
MAKES OTHER ISSUES MOOT, UNLESS THE COURT CONSIDERS REVIEW OF 
SUCH ISSUES NECESSARY TO DETERMINE PREVAILING PARTY OR 
REASONABLENESS OF ISP'S ACTIONS ON THE ISSUE APPEALED, COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
A. Introduction. 
Attorney fees are mandatory under I. C. § 12-117, if the non-prevailing party pursued or 
defended the action without a reasonable basis in law or fact. For fifteen (15) years, Rule 10.03 
has been simply~ clarification that, if a new licensee made actual sales eight (8) hours a day, no 
fewer than six ( 6) days a week, that was one way the new licensee could demonstrate compliance 
with the "actual use" requirement of l.C. § 23-908 (4). The Director, however, departed from the 
many years of agency enforcement, in declaring that Rule 10.03 was ambiguous and could be 
interpreted three different ways. He announced a novel interpretation: one glass of liquor shall 
be required to be sold during each day the premises is open, eight (8) hours a day, six (6) days a 
week. This new interpretation is contrary to long-rim~ agency practices, constituted improper 
rulemaking, and was an unreasonable exercise of police power. This was the agency's own rule. 
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If ISP knew the rule to be ambiguous, it had an obligation to promulgate a rule amendment 
properly. This was an agency mistake that never should have been made. As ISP's actions have 
been without a reasonable basis in law or fact, this Court should award attorney fees pursuant to 
I.C. § 12-117. 
B. Fuchs is the prevailing party. 
The Direr.tor :mlPn thi:it thr. mlr. w11s Rmhiguom;, as conten'1ed tiy fu~~ ftQOO t~e 
beginning. J.C. § 12-117 ( 1) provides that a prevailing party shall be awarded attorney fees, 
where the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or civil 
judicial proceeding involVing as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as 
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attotney's fees, 
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
I.C. § 12-117 
fu Fischer v. City o/Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 355-56 (2005), the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated that the "statute is not discretionary but provides that the court must award attorney fees, 
where a state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding involving 
a person who prevails in the action. 
Though the Director dismissed the revocation proceeding, he found that Fuchs was the 
non-prevailing party: 
Under the totality of the circumstances, it would not be entirely correct to say that 
ABC is the prevailing party or that Fuchs acted without a reasonable basis in fact 
or law. Therefore, the Director declines to award attorney fees to either party. 
Director's Final Order at 18. 
However, Rule 54 (d) (1) (B), I.R.C.P., provides that, when determining the "prevailing 
party/ courts consider the final resuit of the action or the relief sought: 
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In detennining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, 
the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of 
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in pan 
and did not prevail in part, and upon so .finding may apportion the costs between 
and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the 
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
I.R.C.P. 54 (d) (1) (B) 
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In Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406,411 (1983), the Court of Appeals explained that 
there are three factors to be considered when detennining which party, if any, prevailed: (1) the 
final judgment or the result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were 
multiple claims or issues between the parties; and the extent to which each of the parties 
prevailed on each of the claims or issues. In Daisy Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, 
Inc, 134 Idaho 259 (Ct. App. 2000), abrogated on other grounds, the Court explained that the 
defendant was the prevailing party because "the result obtained in this case was a dismissal of 
Daisy's action with prejudice, the most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved by 
Paintball as a defendant." Id. at 262. As in that case, Fuchs received the "most favorable 
outcome that could possibly be achieved," a dismissal of the administrative proceeding. While 
the Director decided a number of issues before him, ruling that quasi-estoppcl did not apply, 
there was no improper rulemaking, and his department did not engage in an unreasonable 
exercise of police power, his rulings on these issues are dicta, as he ruled that Ru.le 10.03 was 
ambiguous, hence void. 
Moreover, the Director ruled against Fuchs on these issues in a clear effort to avoid 
attorney fees under I. C. § 12-117. By releasing Fuchs' license from the administrative sanction, 
Fuchs prevailed. Yet, since any award of attorney fees would have been paid out of ISP funds, 
the Director fashioned a Final Order that suggested that Fuchs did not prevail. One of the 
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purposes of judicial review mandated by I.C. §§ 67-5270 and 67-5279 is to guard against bias by. 
an administrative officer. This Court is the first adjudicator in a position to rule on attorney fees 
without bias. The Hearing Officer did nol have authority to award attorney fees, because when 
he issued his Preliminary Order, administrative officers or agencies had no authority to award 
fees under I.C. § 12-117. While the law bad changed by the time the Director reviewed the 
issue, J.C. § 12-117 expressly providing that authority, the Director's Final Order evidences bias 
because payment of costs would be out of bis department's funds. In State ex rel. Richardson v. 
Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho 1 (1989), a liquor licensee challenged the constitutionality of the 
procedure, whereby the hearing examiners were chosen from a list maintained by the 
Department of Law Enforcement (predecessor to ISP) and were compensated by the Department 
on a case by case basis.3 The Idaho Supreme Court found that the system provided for a check 
on any potential bias. "The potential for bias is cured by the fact that the parties have the right to 
judicial appeal of any administrative decision manifesting an abuse of discretion, arbitrary and 
capricious disposition, or findings whjch are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence presented 
· at the hearing. Id. at 4. This Court's review of the Director's Final Order provides Fuchs that 
protection from the Director's "arbitrary and capricious disposition" of this matter. 
Since Fuchs obtained the result he sought in defending this action, he is the "prevailing 
party." 
3 Pierandozzi had argued that the system was analogous to the form.er Justice of the Peace system condemned by 
tlle U.S. Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) where the Court held that due process of law was 
denied to one tried before a judicial ufficer whose sole source of income was the fines collected from the accused. 
Id. at4. 
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C. ISP has acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or Jaw." 
From the date the administrative complaint was filed, ISP's actions have been without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. With this case, ABC chose to ignore fifteen (15) years of agency 
interpretation of Rue 10.03 and required Fuchs to make multiple, hourly sale of alcohol. This 
new expression of agency policy violated the Idaho Constitution, exceeded statutory authority, 
was improper rulemaking, and constituted an unreasonable exercise of police power. The 
Director only compounded ABC's errors. The Director declared that the rule promulgated by his 
agency was ambiguous and could be interpreted three ways, not including the manner it was 
previously interpreted by ISP for many years. Fuchs has been put in the position of bearing the 
financial burden of correcting ISP's mistakes which never should have been made. This Court 
should award attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117. 
In Bogner v. Dep't of Revenue and Taxation. 107 Idaho 854, 859 (1984), the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained that "the purpose of that statute is two-fold: (1) to serve as a deterrent 
to groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne 
unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to 
correct mistakes agencies should never had made." In Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 
349, 356-357 (2005), the Court explained further that ''[t]he statute is not discretionary but 
provides that the court must award attorney fees where a state agency did not act with a 
reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding." The Coun has repeatedly held that one of the 
purposes behind the statute is to remedy situations where persons have borne the financial costs 
resulting from groundless and arbitrary agency actions: 
The purpose of 1.C. § 12-117 is two-fold: First, it serves "as a deterrent to 
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second1 it provides] a remedy for 
persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial bw-dens defending 
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against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never 
should have made. 
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Reardon v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115, 118 (2004) (quozing Rincover v. Stute, Dept. of 
Fin., Sec. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 548-49 (1999) (quoting .Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue and 
Taxation, l 07 Idaho 854, 859 (1984)). Similarly, in Lane Ranch Partnership, v. City of Sun 
Valley, 145 Idaho 87 (2007), the Court held that a government entity's "actions are considered 
arbitrary and capricious if made without a rational basis, or in disregard of the facts and 
circumstances, or without adequate determining principles." Id. at 90. 
Here, for many years, ISP did not require ~ew licensees to make ''actual sales" of liquor-
by-the drink.4 ABC ignored this long-time agency interpretation and enforcement of Rule 10.03 
in filing against Fuchs its adm1nistrative proceeding, requiring multiple hourly ~ales eight (8) 
hours a day, six (6) days a week. From the filing of this administrative action, ABC has acted. 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The Director compounded this unreasonableness, when 
he rejected long-time agency interpretation and enforcement and declared that the Rule was 
ambiguous, capable of being interpreted three ways. ISP's actions have been wholly arbitrary 
and without "adequate detennining principles." 
For example, the Director admitted that Rule 10.03 is ambiguous. New interpretations of 
Rule 10.03 have surfaced at every stage ofthis proceeding. First, there was the original 
interpretation; that relied upon by Fuchs, based on direction given by Lt. Clements' 
4 Three past ISP administrators refused to iotetpret Rule 10.03 to require "actual sales'' based upon public policy 
grounds. "Such a requirement would have been unlawful, in violation of public policy. Rankin Aff. at ,r 4. "[S]such 
a req_uirement would be nonsensical, since, as a matter of common sense, a licensee cannot control how many people 
come into a licensed premise and buy drinks over any period of time." Gould Aff. at ,r 5. "A new licensee would 
also satisfy the requirements of l.C. § 23-908 ( 4), if he or she secured a qualified premise and made liquor available 
at that premise, without making sales.,; Thompson Aff.. at ,i 5. 
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Administrative Assistant, that Rule 10.03 was not mandatory.5 Second, there was the 
interpretation annowiced at Lt. Clements's deposition: multiple hourly sales, eight (8) hours a 
day, six (6) days a week. Third, there was the interpretation by the Hearing Officer: "actual sales 
ofliquor sometime while [the lit;ensee] is in operation for eight hours a day/no fewer than six 
days a week." Preliminary Order at 15. Fourth, there was the interpretation announced by the 
Director: "sell at least one ( 1) glass of liquor sometime during every day that the establishment 
is open." Director's Final Order at 11. Fifth, there was the alternate interpretation announced by 
the Director, but then rejected: "sell at least one (1) glass of liquor sometime during every day 
that the establishment is open.'' Id.at 10. Amazingly, the Director did not include the prior 
administrators' interpretation of Rule 10.03 even as one of his options. The Director has 
admitted that his agency created "confusion" by not applying Rule 10.03 consistently. Each time 
ISP announced a new interpretation of Rule 10.03, it demonstrated its lack of"adequate 
detennining principles." 
Moreover, this "confusion" was a mistake that never should have been made. For fifteen 
(15) years, ISP interpreted the rule one way. IfISP or its bureau wished to depart from this 
policy, it had a legal duty to amend the rule to reflect its new policy: that .. actual sales" would 
now be required. See, Asarco, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719 (2003).6 Since it failed to promulgate 
a new rule, Fuchs only knew past agency practices and what he was told. He was told by ABC 
Management Assistant, Denise Rogers, and be knew_ from his experience with his four Nampa 
licenses, that alcohol sales were not required in any particular amount over any specified time 
frame. See Rogers Aff. at ,r 4; Donesley Aff., Exhibit R-4.7 
5 See Denise Rogers Affidavit at f 4. 
6 See, infra, Section, VI. E., "ISP has Engaged in Improper Rulemaking." 
7 The Director opiDed that Fuchs knew that "actual sales" were required, because a form letter Rent to new 
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Even though the Director conceded that the rule was ambiguous, he concluded, 
incredibly, that Fuchs bad violated Rule 10.03 ... Fuchs has failed to meet his obligation of 
making at least one (1) sale per day as required by the Director's interpretation of the rule." 
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Final Order at 11. The Director fails to acknowledge that Fuchs complied with the Hearing 
Officer's inteipretation of the rule and with the prior administrators' interpretation and historical 
enforcement. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a basic rule of statutory construction is, 
first, to look at how an agency previously has applied a statute or rule, particularly if it has done 
so over a long period of time, to ascertain its rneanmg. The "application of the statute is an aid to 
construction, especially when the public relies on the application over a long period of time." 
Hamiltor,, v. Reeder Flying Services, 135 Idaho 568, 571 (2001). Contrary to Idaho law> the 
Director is doing just the opposite. He is ignoring long-time agency application of a rule in favor 
of a new rule that he announced only in his Final Order against Fuchs. 
ABC acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law," when it ignored longstanding 
agency intexpretation of Rule 10.03 and sought revocation or forfeiture of Fuchs' liquor license, 
because he did not make multiple, hourly sales of liquor eight (8) hours a day, six (6) days a 
week. The Director acted "without a reasonable basis in fact or law," when he declared the rule 
ambiguous and announced a new legal standard in the Director's Final Order. ISP's actions have 
been arbitrary and capricious and without any identifiable detennining principles. 
This Court should reverse the Directors Final Order on the issue of attorney fees and 
award attorney fees and costs to Fuchs pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. 
licensees' states that "actual sales" are required. Director's Final Order at 14. However, this form letter only quotes 
a portion of Rule 10.03, omitting the most critical word, "during," rendering it meaningless. The pertinent language 
was idc,ntical to that in a letter sent by ABC in ~003, when "actual sales'' were not required. Furthmnore, the 
Director, as a matter of law, cannot requ.ire compliance with a Rule that he says is ambiguous. See, infra. 
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VI. 
AS TO ISSUES OTHER THAN AMBIGUITY, PREVAILING PARTY, AND 
REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR LAW, DISCUSSED ABOVE, THE COURT MAY 
CHOOSE TO REVIEW SUCH OTHER ISSUES. AND THE DIRECTOR'S RULINGS 
WERE ERRONEOUS, NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
A. This Court need not reach the merits, because Fuchs was the prevailing party. 
and ISP has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or Jaw. 
As discussed above, Fuchs was the "prevailing party," and ISP acted "without a 
reasonable basis in fact or Jaw." The rule was found to be ambiguous, hence void. 
Consequently, if this Court reverses the Director on the issue of attorney fees, the merits of this 
case become moot. l.C. § 67-5279 (4), which governs the District Coun's scope ofreview, 
provides, in part, that "agency ac.tion shall be affirm.en 11:nlr.si:. i:.11h.i:.ta:ntial right.q ·of the appellant 
have been prejudiced." Notwithstanding that the ambiguous rule is void, and every other ground 
alleged moot, it is respectfuUy argued that the void, ambiguous ru]e fmding, which has not been 
appealed by eiLher party, contro]s. The Court need not go further on the merits. 
However, if this Court detennines that it must consider the merits of the underlying case. 
the Director's Fina] Order was not based upon substantial evidence, was arbitrary and capricious, 
and an abuse of discretion. The administrative proceeding below should be di~missed and Fuchs 
awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. 
B. I.C. § 23-908(4) and Rule 10.03 are unambiguous and do not require that a 
new licensee off the lists sell liquor drinks. 
Idaho Code § 23-908(4) sets forth the requirement for new licensees that each must put 
the Jicense into "acn1al use'' at the time of an issuance and remain in use for at least six (6) 
consecutive months or be forfeited: 
Each new license issued on or after July i, 1980, shall be placed into actual use 
by the original licensee at the time of issuance and remain in use for at ]east six 
( 6) consecutive months or be forfeited to the state and be eiigible for issue to 
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The Idaho Code does not define the tenn .. actual use." LC. § 23-908( 4). Although ISP 
promulgated rules regarding alcohol beverage control, it did not promulgate a rule to define 
"actual use." Instead, ISP promulgated Rule 10.03, which sets forth one manner in which 
requirements of J.C. § 23-908(4),. pertaining to "actual use,'' may be satisfied: 
The requirement of section 23-908(3), Idaho Code, that a new license be placed 
into actual use by the licensee and remain in use for at least six ( 6) consecutive 
months shall be satisfied if the licensee makes actual sales of liquor by the drink 
during at least eight (8) hours per day, no fewer than six (6) days per week. 
(Emphasis added.) 
IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03.8 
When the language of the statute or regulation is clear and unambiguous, statutory 
construction is unnecessary. And courts ''need only detennine the application of the words to the 
facts of the case at hand.'' Porter v. Board of Trustees, 141 Idaho 11, 14 (2004). Courts read 
rules the same way. "The language of the rule, like the language of a statute, should be given its 
plain, obvious and rational meaning. In addition, this language should be construed in a context 
of the rule and statute as a whole, to give effect to the rule and to the statutory language that the 
rule is meant to supplement." Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 140 (2001). 
The literal wordr; of the IDAP A rule are clear and unambiguous. The requirement of 
Idaho Code § 23-908( 4) is satisfied, "if the Jicensee makes actual sales of liquor by the drink 
during at least eight (8) hours per day, no fewer than six (6) days a week'' for the first six months 
after issuance off a priority list. There is no requirement of the number of sales per hour, or per 
day, or per week. There is no mandatory language, such as "must" or "shall," stating that this is 
8 This is how Rule 10.03 appeared in 1993. In 1994, it was· amended to reflect the renumbering of I.C. § 23-908: 
the: "actual use:" provision was recodified from I.C. § 23-908 (3) to 23-980 (4). Further, and as discussed, infra, 
Rule 10.03was amended in 2007 whereby "shall be" was deleted in favor of"is." 
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the only means by which the statute may be satisfied Rather, strictly construed, Rule 10.03 
provides that making sales of liquor drinks during eight (8) hours a day, no fewer than six (6) 
days a week is one way, but not the only way, that the 'actual use' requirement of I.C. § 23-
908(4) may be satisfied. The rule is a "safe haven." 
This is how three past ISP administrators interpreted and applied the Rule for fifteen (15) 
years. John Gould, who was Assistant Deputy Director of ISP and in charge of the ABC, when 
IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 was promulgated, stated that the purpose of the rule was to ensure that 
new licensees would put the licenses into a_ctual use and "not simply file away somewhere 
without any intention to use it in the manner required. (Gould Aff at ~ 3 ). Captain Rankin stated 
"[t]o my knowledge, there never was a requirement that a new licensee make actual sales of 
alcohol," requiring sales of liquor drinks. (Rankin Aff. at ,r 3). Major Thompson explained that 
"ISP did not require actuai sales of alcohol to meet the actual use fequirements of I.C. § 23-908 
(4), because public policy required by the Idaho Constitution prohibits promoting alcohol sales 
and consumption." (Thompson Aff. at ,r 6.) 
The Director ignored the long-time agency application of Rule 10.03, in summarily 
declaring the rule ambiguous and now requiring new licensees to .. sell at least one (1) glass of 
liquor sometime during every day that the establishment' is open." Director's Final Order at 11.9 
As it was the Director's spontaneous interpretation applied against Fuchs that created the 
ambiguity, this Court should reverse the Director's Final Order as being not supported by 
substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. 
9 The Director's interpretation of Rule 10.03 is a new expression of agency policy because he announced that the 
"clarification of the proper intei:pretlltion of IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 set forth in this Final Order shall have 
prospective effect only." Director's Final Order at 18. For this "clari.fic11.tion lo have the force of law, the Director 
must promulgate a new rule ame11dment. See, infra. 
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C. If Rule 10.03 ls ambiguous, its ambiguities must be construed in favor of 
Fuchs. 
for fifteen (15) years, ISP required tbat new licensees secure a qualified premise and 
make actual sales of liquor-by the-drink sometime, while in operation during eight (8) hours a 
day, six (6) days per week for six (6) months, to comply with J.C.§ 23-908 (4) and Rule 10.03. 
This application of Rule 10.03 was consistent with the legislative purpose ofl.C. § 23-908 (4), to 
discourage speculation. Now, after ABC attempted to require multiple hourly sales of alcohol 
during eight (8) hours ::i day/six (6) days a week, the Director has ruled in this case that Rule 
10.03 was ambiguous as a matter of law. Under Idaho law, ambiguities in a statute or a rule 
must be construed against the agency that drafted them. If this Court chooses to decide the 
underlying merits of the case, this Court should reverse the Director's decision in his Final 
Order. 
..It is clear in Idaho law that adminis~tive regulations are subject to the same principles 
of statutory construction as statutes. Interpretation of such a rule should begin, therefore, with an 
examination ofliteral words of the rule." Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581,586 (2001) 
(internal citations omitted). Where language of a statute or ordinance is ambiguous, however, 
the courts look to rules the construction for guidance." Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley 
County, 137 Idaho 192, 197 (2002) (citing Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175 (1977)). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that a basic rule of statutory construction is, first, to look at how an 
agency previously has applied a statute or rule to ascertain its meaning, particularly if it has done: 
so over a long period of time. The "application of the statute is an aid to construction, especially 
when the public relies on the application over a long period of time." Hamilton v. Reeder Flying 
Services, 135 Idaho 568,571 (2001). In State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, i30 Idaho 727, 
733 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court explained that this was a "basic rule of statutory 
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Statutes are documents having practical effects. It is therefore improper to 
consider them in the abstract, without talcing into consideration. the historical 
framework to which they existed . . . where contemporaneous and practical 
interpretation bas stood unchallenged for a considerable length of time, it will be 
regarded as very important in arriving at the proper construction of the statute." 
PAGE 26/38 
Hagerman Water. Right Owners, 130 Idaho at 733 (quoting Sutherland Stat. Const. (5th 
Ed. 1992)). 
Here, previous ISP policymakers have long realized the "practical effects" of requiring a 
new licentee to produce sale-~ dnring r.vr.ry hnnr r1nrine r.ieht (R) honrn a nay, Rix (fi) days a week 
was irrational, particularly in the case of a new business: 
Such a technical reading was not made at anytime during my employment, would 
have been irrational, and would have made it impossible, if enforced strictly, for 
any new licensee to maintain a retail alcohol beverage license for the six (6) 
months tbM c;nr.h "ar.ntRl nsr:" woulri havr. heen required. There certainly are 
hours when no sales are made, especially in starting a new business. 
(Gould Aff. a14). 
In light of these practical and public policy concerns. ISP had long recognized the harsh 
results that would follow, if a new licensee was expected to produce sales of alcohol during each 
and every hour during eight hours a day, six days a week, for .the first six months. "To enforce 
the New License Rule to require actual sales p~ hour, per day, per week or otherwise, would 
mean that a new licensee would technically be· in violation of the rule should time pass without a 
patron purchasing a drink of alcohol." (Thompson Aff. at ,I 4). Courts will not interpret starutes 
and rules that would create hardships or produce oppressive or absurd results. Higginson v. 
Westergard, 100 Idaho 687,691 (1979).10 
10 The prior agency application of Rule 10.03 was consistent with the Idaho public policy against the promotion of 
alcohol sales and consumption. "The first concern of all good government is the virtue and sobriety of the people, 
and the purity of the home. The legislature should further ttll wise and well directed efforts for the promotion of 
temperance and morality." IDAHO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE m, § 24. This Constitutional policy was behind past 
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Finally, Idaho courts construe ambiguous statutes and rules against the agency that 
drafted them. "Some courts have gone so far as to hold that, in suits involving a public 
administrative agency, the rules and regulations of such agency should be strictly construed 
against it Any ambiguities contained therein shall be resolved in favor of the adversary." 
Higginson, 100 Idaho at 691 (internal citations omitted). If there is an ambiguity in IDAPA 
11.05.01.010.03, it is of ISP's making. The Director declared that Rule 10.03 was ambiguous 
and could be interpreted in three ways. Since it was ISP that wrote and promulgated the rule, all 
ambiguities must be construed against it. Iftbis Court reaches the merits of the Director•s Final 
Order, it should reverse the Director and hold that, if Rule l 0.03 is ambiguous, it must be 
construed against ISP. 
D. ISP is prohibited from taking inconsistent positions under the doctrine of 
guasi-estoppel. 
The Director held that ABC was not barred by quasi-estoppel from taking positions 
inconsistent with positions previously taken by the agency. First, the Director stated that Fuchs 
knew that "actual sales'' were required, because he was issued a form letter stating sales would 
be required. Second, the Director stated that Fuchs could show no detrimental reliance. Each 
reason set forth by the Director is not supported by substantial evidence. 
Should this Court reach the issue of quasi-estoppel, it should hold that ISP is barred from 
taking inconsistent positions to Fuchs' detriment. Jn Terrazaz v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193 
(2009), the Idaho Supreme Coun stated the elements of quasi-estoppel: 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when (1) the offending party took a 
different position than his or her original position, (2) either (a) the offending 
party gained an advantage or caused a ~sadvantage to the other party; (b) the 
ISP enforcement of the rule. "ISP did not require actual sales of alcohol to meet the actual use requirements ofl.C. 
§ 23-908 (4). because public policy re<tuired by the Idaho Constitution prohibits promoting alcohol sales and 
consUD')J)tion .. , (Thompson Aff. at 1J 6). 
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other party was induced to change positions; or ( c) it would be unconscionable to 
permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she 
has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in.· 
Id. at 200, n. 3. 
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Here, the Hearing Officer held that ABC should be estopped from its current 
interpretation ofIDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. ABC "is now 
taking inconsistent positionis of its past practices regarding requirements of new liquor 
licensees." Preliminary- Order at 18. The Director disagreed, stating that the Hearing Officer 
erred, positing that "taking inconsistent positfons is not enough to establish the doctrine of quasi-
estoppel. The party against whom estoppel is being sought must be 'reaping unconscionable 
advantage' by changing positions and the other party must be harmed by the changing 
positions." Director's Final Order at 13. 
The Director ignored critical facts and misapplied the law. First, the Director stated "[i)n 
the present case, ABC has taken inconsistent positions but only in the sense that prior 
administrators interpreted Rule 10.03 one way, and now Lt Clements is interpreting the rule in a 
different manner." Director's Final Order at 13. This statement alone satisfied the first prong of 
the Terrazaz test, the offending party taking a c:lifferent position. But, it does not state all the 
facts. The evidence in the record shows that Lt. Clements also took positions inconsistent with 
positions that he bad taken in 2005. 
In January 2005, ABC commenced an investigation of Fuchs' four Nampa licenses, 
Jokin' Jacobs, Brookes Bar, Chelsea Bug's Bar and Rocldn' Ryans. (Exhibit R-4). ABC 
determined how many sales were made at each of these licensed premises. 11 On April 15, 2005, 
11 Jokin' Jacobs Bar reported to~l sales ofSl 10.03 tci the Idaho Tax Commission for the period from November 1 
to December 31, 2004. Brook;e's Bar reported total sales of $68.18 to the Idaho Tax Commission for the period 
from November 1 to December 31, 2004. Chelsea Bus's Bar reported total sales of $63.18 to the Idaho Tax 
Commission for the period from November 1 to December 31, 2004. Rockin' Ryans reported total sales of $30.18 
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ABC prepared Administrative Violation Notices for each license. ABC detennined that "liquor 
purchases for Chelsea Bug's Bar from October 1- December 31, 2004 was $19.15." (Exhibit R-
DF-6). It detennined that "Sales tax paid for Chelsea Bug's Bar for October - December 2004 
was $3.79." (Id.) Nevertheless, ABC did not seek revocation or forfeiture against Fuchs for not 
making a sufficient number of sales of liquor drinks. 12 Rather, it alleged against Fuchs in that 
prior administrative case only that Chelsea Bug's Bar was not open for business a sufficient 
number of hours to meet the "actual sales ofliquor by the drink during at least eight (8) hours a 
day, no fewer than six (6) days a week."l3 
The Director disregarded these facts. He stated that Fuchs .. was notified in a February 
25, 2008 letter from Nichole Harvey, ABC Management Assistant, that the license at issue in this 
case (i.e., License No.7323.01 for Aubrey's) would be subject to the actual sales requirement.'' 
Director's Final Order at 14. However, this fonn letter had done nothing more than cite a 
portion of Rule 10.03, stating, as usual, that: "you will make actual sales of alcohol at least eight 
(8) hours a day, six (6) days a week [Idaho Code§ 23-(08(4)]." (Exhibit R-DF-1). It did not 
even include the most important qualifying word in the rule, "during." Moreover, it did not 
inform that multiple drinks per hour, every hour for eight (8) hours a day, six (6) days a week are 
to tbe Idaho Tax Commission for the period from November 1 to December 31, 2004. (Dones]ey Aff.; El.b.lbit R-4.) 
12 In the proceedings below, ABC blamed this lack of enforcement on lack of manpower. (Clements Affidavit dated 
October 23, 2009, at~ 24). This is refuted by its own Administrative Violation Notice. ABC knew how many. sales 
Fuchs had made at each of these four bars. (Exhibit R-4). ABC identi£es how many sales were in the Incident 
Report attached to the Administrative Vjo)ation Notice. (Exhibit R-DF-6). ABC bad obtained alt of the necessary 
evidence it would have needed to pursue a revocation of Fuchs' Nampa licenses. The only logical inference that can 
be made from ABC's decision not to do so is that "actual saJes'' was not an issue in 2005. 
i; Chelsea Bug's Bar, like the other three Nampa bars, wall penoittcd by the Nampa City Council to be open for 
business from 7:00 am to 3:00 pm. T.C § 23-927 establishes the legaJ hours for the sale of liquor to be 10:00 am to 
1 :00 am. The conflict between the city ordinance and 1.C. § 23-927 left Chelsea Bug's Bar only five hours a day in 
which to seJJ liquor. This conflict was resolved by the Nampa City Council, which allowed Fuchs to modify his 
hours to conf otm Lo the Idaho Code. 
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required, which is what Lt. Clements was demanding in these proceedings. (Clements' 
Deposition at P. 36). 14 
Finally, Denise Rogers, former ABC Management Assistant, specifically told Mr. Fuchs 
that he was only required to roake alcohol "available," and that his operation was required to be 
open eight (8) hours a day, six (6) days a week. (Rogers' Deposition at, 4). Ms. Rogers had 
previously sent Fuchs a fonn letter, in 2003, which contained the exact same language that Ms. 
Harvey stated in 2008, to wit: ''you will make actual sales of alcohol at least eight (8) hours a 
day. six (6) days a week." [Idaho Code§ 23-908 (4)) (Compare ISP Correspondence to Fuchs 
dated May 3, 2003 Exhibit R-DF-1 with ISP Correspondence to Fuchs, dated August 27, 2007, 
Exhibit R-DF-7). Consequently, the logic of the Pirector's ruling that Fuchs should have 
known that he could disregard that language in 2003, but not in 2008, is arbitrary, capricious and 
an abuse of discretion. 
The second prong of the Terrazaz test is that "either (a) the offending party gained an 
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party." Terrazaz at 200, n.3. Fuchs was 
disadvantaged, because, based upon information received from ABC and its past practices, 
including those of Lt. Clements, Fuchs leased the Coeur d'Alene business for a two year tenn 
and has continued to operate the business under the license at 2065 West Riverstone Drive, #207 
in Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai County, Idaho. (Fuchs Aff.; Exhibit R-DF-9). Fuchs obtained all 
necessary licenses and permits required by state and local agencies. (Fuchs Aff.; Exhibits &-
u The Director also ruled that Fuchs was on notice, because of a letter sent by Lt Clements to Fuchs' present 
attorney five years earlier. "Indeed, as early as July 20, 2005, Fuchs' attorney, Brian Donesley, was notified in a 
letter from Lt. Clements that henceforth. Rule 10.03 would be intetpreted to require actual sales. See E:ldu'bit 
CS .bb." Director's Final Order at 14. However, Mr. Donesley was not representing Fuchs, but another licensee, 
when Lt Clements sent that letter in 2005. The record reflectis that :Mr. Donesley did not represent Fuchs in any 
matter until after the filing of the ComplaiT,t for Revocation or Forfeiture of Retail Alcohol Beverage License on 
October 23, 2008. Furthermore, ABC admitted in discovery that it had not initiated any administrative actions 
against new 1icensees for failure to make actual sales lllltil 2008. Exhibit R-4; (Complainant's Response to 
Interrogatory No. 19). 
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DF-10, 11, 12). He employed staff and obtained unemployment and workers compensation 
insurance. (Fuchs Aff.; Exhibits R-DF-13, 14, 15). The Director's statement that .. [t]here is 
simply no evidence in the record of detrimental reliance or change of position by Fuchs" is clear 
error. Director's Final Order at 14.15 
In Young v. ldaho Dept. of Law Enforcement, 123 Idaho 870 (Ct. App. 1993, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals ex.plained that the Department of Law Enforcement, predecessor to ISP, could 
be barred under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, from taking inconsistent positions to a licensee's 
detriment. ISP has done that The Director failed to recognize in his Final Order that Lt. 
Clements took positions with Fuchs inconsistent with positions he took in 2005. The Director 
failed to recognize in his Final Order that Fuchs relied to his detriment on ABC's past positions 
and practices, when be executed a two-year lease and opened and maintained business, obtained 
all licenses and permits and employed staff to operate Aubrey's House of Ale. Accordingly, the 
Director's Final Order is not supported by substantial evidence. If this Court reaches the issue of 
quasi-estoppel, it should reverse the Director's. Final Order, dismiss the underlying action and 
· award attorney fees and costs to Fuchs pursuant to I.C. § 12-11 7. 
E. ISP has engaged in improper rulemak.ing. 
The Director announced in his Final Order the new manner in which Rule 10.03 
henceforth was to be enforced: a new licensee must "sell one ( 1) glass of liquor sometime during 
every day that the establishment is open. The e.stablishment must be open for at least eight (8) 
15 Analyticttll.y, the Director erred, in tbat he misapplied the factors listed in Terrazcu. For example, the Director 
stated that "taking inconsistent positions is not enough: .. the party against whom estoppel must be "reaping an 
unconscionable advantage' by changing positions and the other party must be harmed by the change in positions. 
Terrazaz, holds, however, that "(1) the offending party took a different position ... and (2) either (a) the offending 
party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other part)' was induced to change 
positions or (c) it would b~ unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from 
one he or she has already derived a benefit from." Ten-azaz, 147 Idaho at 200.n.3 ( emphasis added). Here, Fuchs 
detrimentally relied on ABC's previous position, satisfying (a) and (b). Thus, there is no inqujzy into (c), whether 
ABC reaped an "unconscionable advantage." The Director misapplied the Te,-,.azaz test, requiring that all three be 
satisfied. 
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hours per day, six ( 6) days a week." Director's Final Order at 11. This was yet another new 
expression of agency policy. Prior administrators had not required "actual sales" ofliquor on 
public policy grollllds. To depart from that policy, ISP was required to promulgate a new rule. 
The Director acknowledges this, when he states that he will be "reviewing the matter for possible 
rulemaking in the near future." Id. at 11. n. 4. Under Idaho law, an agency must follow the 
ntlemakine pror.r,nnres, when it changes polici~s that affect the public. ABC did not do this, 
when it attempted to require multiple hourly sales. The Director did not do this, when he 
announced the .. one (1) glass of liquor" per day rule. Accordingly, both ABC and the Director 
have engaged in improper, infonnal rulemaking. 
In Asarco Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723 (2003), the Idaho Suprome Court explained 
that T.C. § 67-5201 (19) states that agency action is a rule, if it (1) is a statement of general 
applicability and (2) implements, interprets or prescribes existing law."16 However, in Asarco, 
this Court observed that this definition is "too broad to be workable." Id. Accordingly, the Court 
provided further guidance, in detennining when agency action requires ru1emak:ing, considering 
that the following characteristics of an agency action are indicative of a rule: (I) has wide 
coverage; (2) applies generally and unifonnly; (3) operates only in future cases; ( 4) prescribes a 
legal standard or directive not otherwise provided by the enabling statute; (5) expresses agency 
policy not previously expressed; and (6) is an ~terpretation oflaw or general policy. Asarco, 
16 I.C. § 67.5201(19) defines a "Rule'' as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of genei:al applicability that 
bas been promulgated in compliance with the provisions of this chapter and that implements, intexprets, or 
prescribes: (a) )aw or policy; or (b) the procedure or practice requirements of an agency. The term includes the 
amendment, repeal, or susponsion of an existing rule, but does not include: 
llJ :!>tatements concerning only the lnremal IW:Wtt.gCIUWL Vl .wlewal pc:;i:suuuc:1 fJUfo.;~c~ uf 1:1.U. cll,CHvJ jW,J uvl 
affecting private rights of the public or procedures available to the public; or 
(ii) Declaratory rulings issued p-ursuant to section 67·5232, Idaho Code; or 
(iii) Int:ra·agency memoranda; or 
{iv) Any written statements given by an agency which pertain to an interpretation of a rule or to the documentation 
of compliance with a role," 
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138 Idaho at 723. 
Here, the Director held that neither ABC's attempt to require multiple, hourly sales 
during eight (8) hours a day, no fewer than (6) days a week, nor his "one (1) glass ofliquor," 
were new rules, citing the last paragraph of J.C. § 67-5201 (19), exempting an agency's written 
interpretations of a rule: 
The tenn [rule] includes the amendment, repeal, or suspension of an existing rule, 
but does not include: any written statements given by an agency which pertain to 
an interpretation of a rule or to the documentation of compli.ance with a rule." 
Idaho Code§ 67-5201 (19 (b) (iv). In this case, ABC's notification to Fuchs 
(including the interpretation adopted by the Director and state in this Final 
Decision) qualify as written statements from the agency to the licensee pertaining 
to how the agency is interpreting Rule 10.03. As such, the interpretations are not 
rules and, therefore, are not subject to the formal rulemaking process. 
Director's Final Order at 15-16. 
The Director's reading of "written statements ... pertaining to a rule" is so broad that no 
agency action could ever be a rule, unless the agency declares it so. Such reading was expressly 
rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in Asarco. Both ABC's and the Director versions of Rule 
10.03 are new expressions of agency policy and, thus, new rules. IDAP A 11.05.01.010.03 was 
promulgated in 1993. From 1993 to until 2008, the rule was never enforced in a manner as to 
require multiple hourly actual sales of alcohol. (Thompson Aff. at, 4; Rankin Af£ at 13; Gould 
Aff. at ,i 3; Otto Aff. at ,r 3; Rogers Aff. at, 3; Donesley Aff. at, 17). With this contested case, 
ABC took the position that a new licensee must sell multiple drinks of alcohol d~g every hour 
during eight (8) hours a day, no fewer than six. ( 6) days a week for the first six ( 6) months. 
"Probably more than one drink. It's plural." (Clements Depo at pp. 35-36). Then, the Director, 
in his Final Order, rejected ABC's interpretation in favor of his own, "one (1) glass ofliquor 
sometime during the day that the establishment is open. Final Order at 11. Each of these new 
interpretations was an expression of new agency policy. No actual sales had been required by 
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past administrators or even by Lt. Clements. 
In his Final Order, the Direetor acknowledges that tulemaking is necessary: "[b ]ecause of 
the ambiguity ofIDAPA 11.05.01.010.03, it would be appropriate for :further clarification of this 
rule. To that end, the Director will be reviewing this matter for possible rulemaking in the near 
future." Director's Final Order at 11, n. 4. IfISP's departure from uncontradicted, past 
practices of prior administrators was not a new expression of agency policy, no rulemak:ing 
would be necessary. The "one (1) glass of liquor'' per day policy is a new policy and, therefore, a 
new ''rule" under the Asarco test. 
If this Court reaches the issue, it should rule that ISP has engaged in improper 
rulemalci.ng, in violation of the AP A. 
F. ISP's conduct in these proceedines bas been arbitrary and an unreasonable 
exercise of police power. 
ISP's various interpretations of is own rules, first requiring multiple hourly sales of 
liquor, then requiring "one (1) glass of liquor sometime during every day that the establishment 
is open," is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of police power and abuse of process. The 
Director fmally announced in bis Final Order bis version of the agency's legal standard as to how 
many actual sale~ are required. In total, if this Court includes the prior agency interpretation of 
the Rule such that no "actual i:;ales" were required, ISP has announced five different 
interpretations of its own Rule. From the moment ABC departed from long-time agency 
interpretation of Rule 10.03, ISP's actions have been arbitrary and unreasonable and have 
violated Fuchs' fundamental right of due process: to give notice of the legal standard Fuchs is 
alleged to have violated. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has explained that, "[a]lthough a liquor license is a privilege 
and not a property right; the licensing procedure cannot be administered arbitrarily.'' Crazy 
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Horse, Inc. v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 762, 765 (1977) (internal citations omitted). In O'Connor v. City 
of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37 (1949), the ldabo Supreme Court held that the City could not limit in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner the licensee's ability to operate a beer parlor: 
The provision in question declaring change in ownership to be a new business is 
an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power and violates the 
constitutional protection given by the due process clauses. 
0 'Connor, 69 ldaho al 43. 
In Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386,392 (1963), the Idaho Supreme C~urt explained that 
the statute involved in the case, I.C. § 23-910, was unconstitutional as applied to the licensee, 
because it created an arbitrary classification system: 
The classification attempted to be set up by such statutory provision, is 
unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory; it attempts discrimination against one 
who happened to hold a retail liquor license at the time of his conviction of a 
felony, as against one who did not hold such a license at the time of his felony 
conviction; no reasonable ground or basis for such a distinction between them, as 
prospective licensees, exists. 
Weller, 8S Idaho at 392. 
In O'Connor and Weller, at least there were defined standards. Here, the legal standard 
of how many "actual sales" has been a moving target. Nevertheless, the Director rejected Fuchs 
argume_nt that ISP's actions have been arbitrary and unreasonable. He said the rule required 
"actual sales," even though he concedes it does not say how many: 
On its face, IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 requires "actual sales." Fuchs' misreading of 
the rule to ignore this express tenn. is a clearly wrong interpretation. Toe only thing 
ambiguous about the rule was whether those actual required sales have to be 
hourly, daily or weekly. The Director has now clarified that only one (1) sale per 
day is necessary to comply with the rule. 
Director's Final Order at 16. 
ABC sought to revoke or forfeit Fuchs' license, based upon its projection that new 
licensees must make multiple hourly sales eight (8) hours a day, six (6) days a week. Lt. 
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Clements testified at deposition that he was not certain how many sales per hour satisfied the 
rule. "Probably more than one drink It's plural. 'Actual sales, eight hours per day' so during 
an eight hour period you have to make sales every hour is the way I understand it." (Clements 
Deposition at pp. 35-36). ABC had refused in discovery to say what the standard was before that 
deposition. In fact, it had never required "actual sales." (See Donesley, Aff. Exhibit R-3). 
Fuchs did not know of any new legal standard, until after this administrative proceeding bad 
already been filed against him. 
The Director states that the only thing ambiguous about the Rule was the amount of sales 
required, "hourly, daily, or weekly." The difference between what amount is actually required is 
the di.ITerence between avoiding a revocation proc_ccding or not. Fuchs, as a new licensee, has 
been unable to do that, because the actual amount was only announced by the Director in his 
Final Order. 17 
While the Director bas finally announced a legal standard, again engaging in improper 
rulemaking, the fact that it took complex and costly administrative litigation for him to do even 
this demonstrates that ISP and its ABC bureau have engaged in an arbitrary and unreasonable 




ISP's actions have been without a reasonable basis in fact or law. This Court should 
reverse the Director's decision in his Final Order and award Fuchs attorney fees and costs 
11Fuchs has actually had more sales of alcohol at Aubrey's House of Ale than he did at four licensed premises he 
operated in Nampa in 2003 to 2005. For example, Chelsea Bug's Bar reported total sales for a two month period of 
$63.18. (Donesley Aff.; Exhibit R-4). Aubrey's House of Ale reported sales for a three month period of$ S98.11. 
(Fuchs Aff.; Exhibit R-DF-17, 18). ABC considered puniuing an administrative action against Fuchs based upon 
the sales at each of the four Nampa bars but chose: against iL (Donesley Aff.; E:a:hibit R-4). 
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pursuant to LC.§ 12·117. Fuchs was the "prevailing party'' even under the decision rendered by 
the Director in his Final Order. Fuchs obtaine~ the result he sought, a decision that Rule 10.03 
was ambiguous and dismissal of the administrative action. Further, ISP acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law, as it has attempted to enforce a rule for which the agency has, at 
various times, announced five different ways i~ should be interpreted. Fuchs was forced to bear 
the financial burden of mistakes that never should have been made. 
If this Court determines that it must reach the merits of the underlying proceeding, it 
should reverse the Director's Final Order in its entirety. Rule 10.03 is unambiguous and not a 
mandatory rule. ABC and the Director rend~ the rule ambiguous by making it a mandatory 
requirement. Under Idaho law, ambiguities are construed against the agency that drafted the rule. 
And, ISP is barred by quasi-estoppel from taking inconsistent positions to Fuchs' detrimental 
relianc_e. Further, ISP engaged.in improper rulemak:ing. Finally, ISP's five interpretations of 
Rule 10.03 have been arbitrary and an unreasonable exercise of police power. 
This Court should reverse the Director's Final Order and award costs and attorney fees to 
Fuchs pursuantto J.C. § 12-117. 
DATED this 15 day of October 2010. 
Brian Donesley 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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I. INTRODUCTION. 
Respondent is the Bureau of Alcohol Beverage Control ("ABC"), a bureau of the Idaho 
State Police. 
Under IDAHO CODE § 23-902(3), "Director" [for purposes of alcohol beverage control 
law] means the Director of the Idaho State Police. Under IDAHO CODE§ 67-2901 (4), "The 
director shall exercise all of the powers and duties necessary to carry out the proper 
administration of the state police, and may delegate duties to employees and officers of the state 
police." 
The Director has specific rule making authority for alcohol beverage control purposes. 
IDAHO CODE § 23-932. By promulgation of ID APA 11.05.01.011.02, the Director delegated "his 
authority for the licensing of establishments which sell alcoholic beverages, as contained in Title 
23, Chapters 9, 10, and 13, Idaho Code, to the, Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau, Idaho State 
Police." 
The Director has the authority to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry 
out the provisions oflDAHO CODE Title 23, Chapters 6-14, pursuant to IDAHO CODE §§ 67-2901, 
23-932, 23-946(b), 23-1330 and 23-1408. 
ABC is the state entity charged under IDAHO CODE Title 23, Chapters 8, 9, 10 and 13 
with the authority to enforce and police Idaho's liquor laws pursuant to IDAHO CODE§ 23-804. 
IDAHO CODE§§ 23-933, 23-1038 and 23-1331 provided the basis and authority for the 
administrative Complaint for Forfeiture of Retail Alcohol Beverage License, which began this 
administrative case. 
Appellant Daniel S. Fuchs ("Fuchs"), dba, Aubrey's House of Ale ("Aubrey's") currently 
holds liquor license number 7323.0, which affords him the privilege of selling beer pursuant to 
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IDAHO CODE § 23-1010, wine by the glass and bottle pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 23-1306, and 
liquor by the drink at retail pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 23-903. Ex. C 1. 
The administrative Complaint for Forfeiture or Revocation of Retail Alcohol Beverage 
License was served on Fuchs on October 23, 2008, by certified mail, return receipt. Fuchs 
received it on October 28, 2008. Fuch's Answer was filed on November 12, 2008. 
The statute and administrative rule at issue in this case are: 
IDAHO CODE § 23-908(4) - Each new license issued on or after July 1, 
1980, shall be placed into actual use by the original licensee at the time of 
issuance and remain in use for at least six (6) consecutive months or be 
forfeited to the state and be eligible for issue to another person by the 
director after compliance with the provisions of section 23-907, Idaho 
Code. Such license shall not be transferable for a period of two (2) years 
from the date of original issuance, except as provided by subsection (5)(a), 
(b), (c), (d) or (e) of this section. 
and 
IDAPA I 1.05.01.010.03. New Licenses. For purposes of Section 23-
908(4), IDAHO CODE, a "new license" is one that has become available as 
an additional license within a city's limits under the quota system after 
July 1, 1980. The requirement of Section 23-908(4), Idaho Code, that a 
new license be placed into actual use by the licensee and remain in use for 
at least six (6) consecutive months is satisfied if the licensee makes actual 
sales of liquor by the drink during at least eight (8) hours per day, no 
fewer than six ( 6) days per week. 
The issue in this case has been the interpretation of the term "actual use" as that term is 
used in IDAHO CODE§ 23-908(4) and the interpretation of the language in IDAPA 
1.05.01.010.03 that such "actual use" of a newly issued city priority list liquor license is 
"satisfied if the licensee makes actual sales of liquor by the drink during at least eight (8) hours 
per day, no fewer than six (6) days per week." 
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II. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW. 
The standard of judicial review of agency actions is found in IDAHO CODE§ 67-52 l 5(g). 
It allows a court to reverse or modify an agency decision only under limited circumstances, 
including, inter alia, a constitutional violation, action in excess of statutory authority, clearly 
erroneous findings of fact, an arbitrary and capricious decision or one characterized by an abuse 
of discretion. State ex rel. Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho 1, 3, 784 P .2d 331, 333 (1989). 
A court reviewing agency actions in an appellate capacity under the AP A must determine 
whether the agency perceived the issue in question as discretionary, acted within the outer limits 
of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the available choices, and 
reached its own decision through an exercise of reason. Haw v. Idaho State Bd of Medicine, 143 
Idaho 51, 137 P.3d 438 (2006) citing Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 643, 39 P.3d 577, 
583 (2001). 
III. ATTORNEY FEES. 
It is evident from Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review that his 
primary goal is to secure an award of attorney fees. He accuses the Director ofldaho State 
Police of bias and argues repeatedly that "Rule 10.03 was ambiguous, hence void" (with no 
citation to authority), that he is the prevailing party and that Respondent acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Appellant, however, whether out of convenience, oversight or 
purposeful avoidance, ignores the one rule of law that controls the issue of whether he is entitled 
to an award of attorney fees in this case under IDAHO CODE§ 12-117. 
Until this dispute arose, there had been no interpretation of either IDAHO CODE § 23-
908( 4) or IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03, which are the code section and administrative rule at issue. 
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In Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 266-67, 207 P.3d 988, 997-98 
(2009), the crux of that case was the interpretation of the term "property interest" as that term is 
used in IDAHO CODE § 7-1402(5)( d). The issue had never been addressed by an Idaho appellate 
court and was therefore a matter of first impression. In Purco Fleet Services, Inc. v. Idaho State 
Department of Finance, 140 Idaho 121, 90 P.3d 346 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court denied the 
Idaho Department of Finance's request for attorney fees on appeal under IDAHO CODE§ 12-121 
because one of the central issues on appeal was the interpretation of the word "claim" as that 
term is used in IDAHO CODE § 26-2223(2) was an issue of first impression. Purco Fleet Services, 
140 Idaho at 126-27, 90 P.3d at 351-52. The Court stated: "A case of first impression does not 
constitute an area of settled law; therefore, the request for attorney fees should be denied." Id. 
The same reasoning and rule of law controls the present question of an award of attorney 
fees. It cannot be said that Respondent acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law when a 
matter of first impression regarding the interpretation of the statute and administrative rule was 
involved. As the Idaho Supreme Court recently held in Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 862,863,204 P.3d 502, 503 (2009), where issues of first 
impression are raised, attorney fees will not be awarded under IDAHO CODE§ 12-117(1). 
Wheeler, 147 Idaho at 267,207 P.3d at 998; Employers Resource Management Co. v. 
Department of Ins., 143 Idaho 179, 185, 141 P.3d 1048, 1054 (2006). 
Because the interpretation oflDAHO CODE§ 23-908(4) and IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 are 
issues of first impression in Idaho, it cannot be said that Respondent brought the present case 
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. Therefore, this Court should deny 
Appellant's request for attorney fees. 
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IV. MERITS OF CASE. 
Appellant asserts that the Court need not reach the merits of this case because he 
characterizes Fuchs as the prevailing party and argues that Respondent acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. Respondent does not concede either of these assertions, of 
course, as the record before the Court demonstrates. Nevertheless, secondary to his attempt to 
secure an award of attorney fees is Appellant's alternative desire that this Court reverse the 
Director's Final Order and, in effect, force the Director to adopt the Hearing Officer's 
Preliminary Order. Appellant argues, in various ways, that the Director's Final Order was not 
based upon substantial evidence, was arbitrary and capricious, and was an abuse of discretion. 
Appellant argues that ID APA 11.05.01.010.03 is a "safe haven" or "one manner in which 
the requirements of IDAHO CODE§ 23-908(4), pertaining to 'actual use' may be satisfied." 
Having repeatedly argued that the rule is "ambiguous, hence void" in his argument for attorney 
fees, citing to Porter v. Board of Trustees, 141 Idaho 11, 14 (2004) and Mason v. Donnelly Club, 
135 Idaho 581, 140 [sic] (2001), Appellant now argues that the language of the rule is "clear and 
unambiguous" and that "[t]he language of the rule, like the language of a state, should be given 
its plain, obvious and rational meaning." Appellant points to the way previous Idaho State 
Police, Alcohol Beverage Control administrators and employees interpreted and applied the 
"actual use" requirement, which was essentially that "actual sales" were not required as long as 
liquor by the drink was merely available for purchase "during eight (8) hours a day, no fewer 
than [sic] (6) days a week." The word "available" is found nowhere in the text of the statute or 
administrative rule at issue. Yet, it is that very interpretation - adding the word "available" -
applied by past ABC administrators and employees and the interpretation made by the Hearing 
Officer in his Preliminary Order that Appellant promotes, and has from the inception of this case. 
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In his Final Order, the Director disagreed with the Hearing Officer and declined to add a 
word to IDAPA I 1.05.01.010.03 that does not exist. Instead, he recognized the rule's ambiguity 
and carefully considered three ways that the rule, by its language, could rationally be interpreted. 
Appellant complains that the Director did not include the prior interpretation, with the addition 
of the word "available" as one of the options, but it really should be no surprise that the Director 
declined to amend the rule outside of the rulemak:ing process. 
The Director accurately recognized the purpose of the "actual use" statute and "actual 
sales" rule as the Legislature's intent that requiring "actual use" was to "discourage speculation 
in liquor licensing where a person would secure a license and then essentially do little or nothing 
with the license and then later sell the license at a greatly increased or inflated price." See, 
Director's Final Order, pp. 6-7. In this context, the Director then identified three ways that the 
"actual sales" rule could be read, based on its text, and noting that "[t]o conclude as did Fuchs, 
the Hearing Officer and prior ISP administrators that no sales are actually required and that the 
rule only requires the establishment to hold liquor by the drink available for sale eight (8) hours a 
day, six ( 6) days a week totally ignores the language of the rule, which requires one (I) or more 
actual sales." 
The Director then outlined three reasonable ways the rule could be interpreted: 
a. sell at least one (I) glass of liquor every hour for at least eight (8) hours, 
six (6) days or more a week. (This would require at least forty-eight (48) 
sales a week and is how ABC is apparently interpreting the rule); or 
b. sell at least one glass of liquor sometime during every day that the 
establishment is open. The establishment must be open for at least eight 
(8) hours per day, six (6) days or more a week. (This would require at 
least six (6) sales a week); or 
c. sell at least one (1) glass of liquor sometime during a period of time 
during which the establishment is open at least eight (8) hours a days, at 
least six (6) days a week (this would require only one sale a week). 
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Having considered these three options, the Director concluded that the "proper 
interpretation ofIDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 is that a new licensee must sell at least one (1) glass of 
liquor sometime during every day that the establishment is open." The Director found this 
interpretation was consistent with the public policy behind the "actual use" requirement, and yet 
"did not impose a particularly onerous burden on the licensee." He concluded that "requiring at 
least one (1) sale is a reasonable, obtainable and objective standard for determining whether a 
licensee is serious about exercising the use of his license or has some other ulterior motive, such 
as speculating in the purchase and sale of licenses." See, Director's Final Order, pp. 10-11. 
This careful reasoning and rational approach can hardly be considered, as Appellant argues, 
"not supported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion." 
See, Appellant's Brief, p. 20. 
The Director's approach is consistent with tried and true rules of statutory construction. 
In construing statutes, the plain, obvious and rational meaning is always to 
be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense. Nagel v. Hammond, 90 
Idaho 96, 408 P.2d 468 (1965); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haworth, 68 Idaho 185, 191 P.2d 359 (1948). When choosing between 
alternative constructions of a statute, courts should presume that the 
statute was not enacted to work a hardship or to effect an oppressive 
result. Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 560 P.2d 497 (1977). 
Consequences of a proposed interpretation can be considered when the 
statute is capable of more than one construction. Id. Constructions that 
would render a statute productive of unnecessarily harsh consequences are 
to be avoided and any ambiguity in a statute should be resolved in favor of 
a reasonable operation of the law. Id. It therefore would follow that 
construction of the undefined terms of an administrative permit should be 
such so as to avoid unduly harsh results and the terms of the permit should 
be construed in a plain, obvious and reasonable manner. 
Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 691, 604 P.2d 51, 55 (1979). 
Appellant's argument that IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 should be "strictly construed" against 
ABC and "resolved in favor of the adversary," assuming but not conceding that that is the rule in 
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Idaho rather than dicta by the Court in Higginson, supra, is exactly what the Director did 
nevertheless. He adopted one of three possible interpretations, without adding language that is 
not in the rule's text yet still promoting the Legislature's public policy to discourage speculation 
in liquor licenses. 
Respondent argues that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel should prohibit the Director from 
interpreting the rule differently than did previous administrators. This argument cannot succeed 
for several reasons. First, it is well established that estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked 
against a government or public agency functioning in a sovereign or governmental capacity. 
Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 70 P.3d 669 (2003). 
Precisely on point is Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 ldaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000). 
In that case, Kelso argued that because the State Insurance Fund ("SIF") had consistently 
represented to its policyholders that the SIF's surplus and reserves belong to the policyholders, 
the SIF be estopped from denying the policyholders' interest. The SIF responded that even if the 
statements rose to the level of estoppel, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to the SIF. The 
Court recited controlling law: 
The general rule is "[e]quitable estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked against a 
governmental or public agency functioning in a sovereign or governmental 
capacity." State ex rel. Williams v. Adams, 90 Idaho 195, 201, 409 P.2d 415, 419 
(1965). Therefore, because the SIF is undisputedly a public agency acting in a 
proprietary capacity, the doctrine of equitable estoppel would normally be 
applicable to the SIF. However, as a statutorily created agency, the SIF has only 
that authority granted to it by its statutory framework. Therefore, "[i]t may not 
exercise its sub-legislative powers to modify, alter, enlarge or diminish the 
provisions of the legislative act which is being administered.'' Roberts v. 
Transportation Dept., 121 Idaho 727, 732, 827 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Ct.App.1991). If 
equitable estoppel were applied to the statements made by the SIF's agents, then 
those agents would have effectively altered the SIF's statutory framework by 
granting the policyholders an ownership interest which the legislature did not 
intend them to have. Cf Pitner v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 94 Idaho 496, 501, 
491 P.2d 1268, 1273 (1971 (holding the agency could be estopped because the 
rule violated by the agent was an administrative rule and the actions taken by the 
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agent were within the statutory authority granted by Congress). Because nothing 
in the SIF's statutory framework granted the SIF the authority to give its 
policyholders an ownership interest in the SIF's assets, equitable estoppel does not 
apply to the SIF under the facts of this case. To hold otherwise would allow an 
administrative agency to expand its own powers and effectively amend statutes 
without legislative action. 
Likewise, any statements made by previous ABC administrators and employees that merely 
having liquor by the drink available for sale satisfied the "actual sales" requirement is mistaken 
statement of law, not fact, and Appellant cannot estop the state through those mistaken 
statements of law. Kelso, 134 Idaho at 138, 997 P.2d 599. Therefore, the mistaken statements of 
law made by previous ABC administrators and employees cannot estop, in any way, current 
ABC officers from enforcing the actual sales rule as written and interpreted by the Director. For 
the Court to hold otherwise would be to condone blatant improper rulemaking. 
Appellant argues that the Director's interpretation of the "actual sales" requirement is 
improper rulemaking. That could not be further from the truth. The Director engaged in lawful, 
thoughtful, rational and reasoned statutory/rule construction. Could IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 be 
clearer? Certainly it could, and if it had been, there would be no need for the Director to 
construe and interpret it as he did. Notably, if Appellant had his way and the Director inserted 
the word "available" into the rule as ABC predecessors did, Appellant would not likely 
complain, even though if anything in the history of the application of the rule amounted to 
improper rulemaking, it was that very insertion. The Director's comment that the rule's 
ambiguity makes further clarification through formal rulemaking appropriate may result in a 
forthcoming clarification more onerous than his very generous "one (1) glass of liquor per day" 
interpretation oflDAPA 11.05.01.010.03. 
Appellant accuses the Director of changing agency policy when he announced his 
interpretation of the "actual sales" rule. The Director was not changing policy. As he carefully 
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explained, he interpreted the rule in a way that is consistent with the public policy behind the 
"actual use" requirement without imposing "a particularly onerous burden on the licensee," and 
that "requiring at least one (1) sale is a reasonable, obtainable and objective standard for 
determining whether a licensee is serious about exercising the use of his license or has some 
other ulterior motive, such as speculating in the purchase and sale of licenses." See, Director's 
Final Order, pp. 10-11. Contrary to Appellant's assertion, there is nothing arbitrary or capricious 
about such a thoughtful and fair analysis and conclusion, and it is consistent with the "actual 
sales" (plural) language. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the Director's reasoned and rational 
decision as set forth in his Final Order in all respects and dismiss Appellant's Petition for 
Judicial Review accordingly. 
DATED this L./.f:/.__, day of November 2010. 
~~~;('ii~ Ck"ry'<F 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Daniel S. Fuchs dha Aubrey's House of Ale ("Fuchs") has been forced 
to bear the financial burden of correcting mistakes made by Respondent Idaho State 
Police, Alcohol Beverage Control ('"ISP/ABC") that never should have been made. For 
fifteen years the law was settled regarding wh~t was required by new licensees to satisfy 
the "actual use" requirement ofl.C. § ·23-908 (4). IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 provides that 
the "actual use" requirement was satisfied if a new licensee "makes actual sales of liquor 
by the drink during at least eight (8) hours per day, no fewer than sjx (6) days per week." 
Past ISP administrators, without exception, based upon the literal reading of the rule and 
public policy had made this IDAPA rule not mandatory_ Rather, the rule provided one 
way, but not the only way, that the ··actual use" requirement ofl.C. § 23-908 (4) could be 
satisfied, Actt.Jal sales were not_ actually required. "Actual sales," without any particular 
number of sales over any period of time was the "safe harbor" to .ensure compliance 
without question. · Fuchs did make actual sales .. during" the first six months.1 
In 2008, ISP/ABC changed policy. It decided to require new licensees make 
"actual sales_" While it did not promulgate a new or amended rule, jt filed this action 
against Fuchs seeking revocation or forfeiture of Fuchs' retail alcohol beverage license_ 
This was an impulsive and arbitrary action. ISP/ABC did not have a standard as to how 
many "actual sales" satisfied its new policy_ Since this proceeding was filed, ISP/ ABC, 
the hearing officer, and the Director each have required different standards. And, the 
--------
1 See, Fuchs Affidavit, Exhibit R-DF-17, 
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Director detennirted that that IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 was ambiguous as a matter of law. 
Ultimately, the Director decided that the rule would be satisfied if a licensee sold one (1) 
g.lass ofliquor per day while the licensed premises is open eight (8) hours a day, six (6) 
days a week. The Director's ruling that IDAP A 11.05.01.010.03 was ambiguous, and 
his failure to promulgate a new rule~ assured that ISP/ABC's filing of this action was 
error, as a matter oflaw. 
Fuchs should not be required to bear the burden of correcting internal 
management mistakes. ISP/ABC's actions were without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
This Court should award Fuchs attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117.2 
n. 
FUCHS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO CORRECT ISP/ABC MISTAKES 
THAT "NEVER SHOULD HA VE BEEN :MADE" 
Since IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 was promulgated in 1993, ISP/ABC had enforced 
the rule consistently and unifonnly. It never required any number of "actual sales" to 
satisfy the ·~actual use" requirement ofT.C. § 23-908 (4) "during" the first six: months. 
Even Lt. Clements, the most recent ABC Bureau Chief, did not require "actual sales." 
(Doncsley Aff. Exhibit R-4). However, ISP/ ABC changed policy with this case. It filed 
this action in October 2008 without knowing how many sales it would deem might satisfy 
the rule. "Probably more than one drink. It's plural.'' (Deposition of Robert Clements, 
Exhibit R-8, pp. 35-36). Ultimately, the Director disagreed With the A.BC Bureau Chief~ 
Lt. Clements, and ruled that IDAP A 11.05.01.010.03 was ambiguous. He ordered that the 
2 ISP/ABC notes that that "(i]t is evidc:nt from Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review 
that his primary goal is to secure an award of attomey fees." (&ej_pon~J3ri..ef..inJ)pp.osition to Petition---~-~ · 
-~-~7ofJudicuirReview "Respondent's Brief' at 3). This is true. The only harm to Fuchs remaining, since the 
Director allowed him to ketip the license, is the cost incurred in this litigation, i.e., the '':financial burdens" 
caused by correcting agency mi.stn.kes that never should have been made." Reardon v. City offBurJey, 140 
Idaho 115, 118 (2004). See Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review at p. 18. 
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rule was subject to being interpreted three ways. Director's Final Order at 10. 
Accordingly, ISP/ ABC should not have filed this action without having first 
promulgating a new or amended rule, announcing to the public, including Mr. Fuchs, that 
it had changed its policy regarding "actual sales." Nor should it have filed this action 
without first establishing how many "actual sales" of liquor drinks would be required to 
satisfy this new policy. As ISP/ABC did neither ofthes~ things, it acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. This Court should award attorney fees and costs to Fuchs 
pursuant to LC. § 12-117. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that one of the purposes behind I. C. § 12-117 
is to provide a remedy where persons have borne the financial costs resulting from 
groundless and arbitrary agency actions: 
The purpose of I.C. § 12-117 is two-fold: First, it serves "as a deterrent to 
growtdless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides] a remedy 
for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens 
defending aga1nst groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes 
agencies never should have made. 
Reardon v. City o/Burley,140 Idaho 115, 118 (2004) (quoting Rincover v. State, Dept. of 
Fin., Sec. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, .548-49 (1999) (quoting Bogner v. State Dep't of 
Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859 (1984)). 
ISP/ ABC argues that it is insulated from an award of attorney fees, regardless of 
the arbitrariness and unreasonableness of its actions, because it believes this is a "case of· 
first impression": 
Because the interpretation oflDAHO CODE§ 23-908 (4) and IDAPA 
11.05.01.010.03 are issues of first impression in Idaho, it cannot be said 
that Respondent brought the present case frivolously, unreasonably, and 
------------Without--foundation. '' 
(Respondent's Biief at 4). 
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This is ISP/ABC's sole a.:rgument in opposition to attorney fees. It is wrong for 
two reasons. First, ISP/ABC should not be entitled to act arbitrarily and capriciously, 
departing :&om lonastanding enforcement posture of its OVll'n rules, and then to bide 
behind the claim that the "case is one of first impression." Such an administrative "one-
free bite" concept would undermine and subsume the LC.§ 12-117 purpose ofprev~ting 
state agcmejes from taking grou.ndlc,as a.etions "ma.de without a rational basis, or in 
disregard of the facts and circumstances, or without adequate determining principle:;i." 
Lane Ranch Partnership, \-'. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 90 (2007). 
Second, this is not a case of firsi impression. "A case of first impression does not 
constitute an area of settled law." Purco Fleet S~rvic111s, Inc. v Idaho State Dept, of 
Finance, 140 Idaho 121 (2004). For many years, past ISP/ABC administrators 
interpreted and enforced I.e. § 23-9'08 (4) and IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 so as not to 
req\lire any number of "a.etua.l sales" or any sales at all. That interpretation was based 
upon public policy grounds ... Such a requirement would have been unlawful, in violation 
ofpublio policy," (Affidavit of Edgar Rankin at 'If 4):' Then, ISP/.ABC changed poli~y. 
wilhoul notice to Fuch~ ur the ge,ne:ral public. Suddenly "actual sales," in some 
unpronounoed'n.umber, were required. 
It has been ;;lcarly ostablishod law that a state agency must promulgate a new or 
amended rule when it decides to change policies that affect the public. In 19!:H, Ueputy 
Attorney General Miehael Gilmore explained to the special legislative eouncil committee 
~ $1111 also, .A.:fftc:bvl.t of John Gould: ••$uoh $ r~mt would be nonsensical, eiooe, ~ o. mo.ttor of 
common sense, a licensee cann0t comrol how many people come into a licensed premise and buy drinks 
over any period of time." (Oould A.ft. at 'If 3); .Affidavit of Major Thomas Thompson: "A new Hcensee 
would also satisfy The reqviremeats of I,C. f 23-908 (4), ifbe or sbt1 1:1~c:urec1 a quaUtlett premiSe ana made 
liquor available at that premise, without makin~ sale!!." (Thompsor,, Af!f. o.t 'If 5). 
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fonned to modernize the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ('"APA") that a. pw:posc 
behind the rulem.ak:ing provisions was to stop ageni;;ies from engaging in informal 
ru.Iemaki:ng: 
Mr. Michael Gilmore, Attom~y Gc:ncral's Task Force, stated the purpose: 
Daniel FuchsQ!T§iis Act is to stop agencies fro?%c1§~~al internal guidance 
doQlllllents and to give supervising attorneys a clear State.cnc:nt from the 
legisl(ll.tw:-e that this has to stop. He said the rcc:ruirement in this Act is that 
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ADMlNlSTRATI\ CBDURES ACT OF 1992, 5 l st Legisla, ~onunittee 
Minutes, p. 392, (October 29, 1991) (Attached as an Appendix to this M~orandum). 
The Idaho Supreme has since, rejected attempts by scate agencies to avoid 
rule.making. In Asarco v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 725 (2003), the Idaho Sum-eme Court 
rejected the State Division of .environmental Quality's attempt to change its policies 
without following formal rulemaking requirements: 
It is undisputed that DEQ did not comply with formal rulcmaking 
requirements. Rather than arguing th.at it substantially complied with the 
rulemaking requirements, DEQ argued it did not have to do so. Thus, the 
district court correctly held the TIMDL is void for failure to comply with 
state adrninistratiYc lnw. 
A.rarco. 138 Idaho at 725, 
Consequently, it is settled law. ISP/ABC must promulgate a new or amended rule to 
change policies affecting the public. 4 
And, it is important that this case involves the interpretation of a rule, not a. 
4 Similarly, IUld 113 cli3CU3scd, i,ifra, the ether issw,;s in ~11 c:qc ho1,ve been s:sttled bY the couns as well. 
Ambiguities in ad.miniatnotive: ru1 .. s :ue c:a»l'trued a5.unst ihc agency tbat drafted them, Hlggtnson "· 
Wutersard, 100 Idaho 687 (19?9). Parties, including state a;:encies. are prohibited from takin£ 
lnconsistent pcai.tions to the ether party' 11 di:mmcnt. Young. \I. D12pQntnfHt of Law .E,iforcement, 123 Idclho 
870 (Ct. App. 1993). Idaho State :Police (or its predecssson} may not enga.tte in iu-bitrary and capricious 
conduct ,.,. that i.s ""'~cnAblc ~arciH of'police power. W11ller v. Hoppe1-, 8.S Idaho 386, .3 92 (l !:163); 
O'C-,nnorv, Ciry of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37 (1949). 
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statute. In Rincover v. State Dept of Fina.nee, 132 Idaho 547 (1999), the Idaho Supreme 
Coun declined to award fees against the State under I.C. § 12-117, because no court had 
interpreted the sitatutc at inue. "At the time, the specific provisions ofl.C. § 30-1413 
wb:i~h we~ ~lied upon by the Department had not been constmed by the courts." 
Rincover, 132 Idaho at 550.5 This is rtot a case a.bout a statute, a law written by the 
legislature, bu-t by a rule -written by the agenQ)' itself. ISP/ABC knew when it filed this 
action, that previous and current administrators bad never enforced the rule in a manna-
that required any numbc:r of"actual sates." (Respondent's Brief at 5). Nevertheless, it 
filed this action without promulgating a new ur 1:1mended rule or pronouncmg, even 
~-knowing,how-mm:ly ··actual sa.l~iitisfy its,1ew poiicy.-{Dcposition of-Roben 
Clements, Exhibit R-8). Consequently. what matters here is not whether I.C. § 23-908 
(4) or IDAPA 11.05.01 .010.03 have been interpreted. by the: courts, but whether the:: 
oa~.;;;~pu.lemalcing obligations under~~~Jve been settled. See, Asarco "'· Page 71 of 132 
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ISP/ABC admi' ·t changed policy when it began re,. ''actual sales." 
(Respondent's Brief at S). It should not have filed this action without first promulgating 
a new or amended rule legally changing its policy. It did not do so. Fuchs should not 
bear the financial burden of correcting ISP/ABC mistakes that never should have been 
made. As ISP/ABC's failure to follow settled administrative law has been without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law, this Court should award attorney fees to Fuchs pursuant to 
LC.§ 12-117. 
s See also, State Dept. of Finance v. Resource Service Corp., Inc., 134 Idaho 282 (2000) (interpretation of 
I.C. § 30-1413.); PurcoFleet Services, Inc v. Idaho State Dept. of Finance, 140 Idaho 121 (2004) 
(interpretation ofl.C. § 26-2223(2)). Appellant Puchs' attorneys have foWld no cases where the appellate 
court denied fees to a petitioner 011 the basis that it was a case of first impression where the agency was 
enforcing its own rule that it determined to be ambiguous. 
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m. 
THE MERITS OF TIDS CASE PROVE THAT ISP/ABC HAS ACTED WITHOUT 
A REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR LAW 
A. ISP/ ABC disregarded longtime interpretation and enforcement of IDAP A 
11.0S.01.01O.03. 
For many years, ISP/ ABC did not require any number of "actual sales" by new 
licensees in the first six months. There are practical, public policy, and state 
constitutional reasons for this previously uncontradicted interpretation and enforcement 
oflDAPA 11.05.01.010.03. In bringing this administrative case for revocation of Fuchs' 
liquor license, ISP/ABC changed its policy. It began requiring some unknown and 
unexplained number of "actual sales" du.ring the firsL six months. It did this arbitrarily 
and capriciously. How many sales would satisfy its new, capricious interpretation was 
not announced. The Director finally ruled in his Final Order that the rule was ambiguous. 
He then announced how he would thereafter apply the rule: a new licensee must sell "one 
(1) gla:.;~ ofli"i_uor ptrr <lay during each day the establishment is open, eight (~J .nours a 
day, six (6) days a week." Director's Final Order at 11. 
ISP/ ABC now argues, though its argument is irrelevant to this case, that the 
Director's new interpretation ofIDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 is somehow now the "proper'' 
one, despite the ambiguity the Director acknowledges, criticizing previous administrators 
for th~ir prior interpretation of the rule: 
Appellant points to the way previous Idaho State Police, Alcohol 
Beverage Control administrators and employees interpreted and applied 
the "actual use" requirement, which was essentially that "actual sales" 
were not required so long as liquor by the drink was merely available for 
purchase during "eight (8) hours a day, no fewer than (6) days. a week." 
The word available is found nowhere in the test of the statute or the 
-~-administrative rule. ---- --- ---~ -
(Respondent's Brief at 5). 
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Curiously, the Director found in his Final Order the rule having been ambiguous, 
capable of interpretation three different ways, notwithstanding that the hearing officer 
found the rule unambiguous. We have come full circle. The Director then, in his "new 
rule," construed the ambiguity. The Director criticizes his predecessors for applying the 
rule as unambiguous, as the hearing officer concluded prior to the Director's cogitation 
on review.6 
For many years ISP/ABC predecessors to Lt. Clements and the Director 
interpreted IDA.PA 11.05.01.010.03 as non-mandatory. Major Thompson stated by 
affidavit that the rule has been interpreted that new licensees needed only make liquor 
"available" during eight (8) hours a day, (6) days a week, not actually sell drinks, because 
a new licensee could not control how many customers patronize a licensed premises: 
To enforce the New License Rule to require actual sales per hour, per day, 
per week or otherwise, would mean that an~ licensee would technically 
be in violation of the rule should time pass without a patron purchasing a 
drink of alcohol. This was determined by TSP policymakers, including by 
me, to be an unreasonable, arbitrary, irrational and impracticable 
interpretation of the New Licenses Rule. 
(Affidavit of Major Thomas Thompson, 14). 
Also, Major Thompson explained that a requirement of "actual sales" would violate the 
state constitutional mandate to promote "temperance and morality," by promoting alcohol 
consumption: 
ISP did not require actual sales of alcohol to meet the actual use 
requirements of T.C. § 23-908 (4) because public policy required by the 
6 Previous ISP administrators found the rult: to be unambiguous as non-mandatory. Thompson Affidavit at 
,nr 4-6). The Hearing Officer found the rule to be unambiguous,_hCJl_ding that a new licensee mua1 make: 
"actual sales'' sometime.while the establishment is open, "eight (8)hours a day, six (6)days a week." 
Preliminary Order at 15. The Director ruled that his own agency rule was ambiguous, in an obvious and 
strained attempt to award of attorney :ice1S under LC.§ 12-117. ISP/ABC contends that this entire appeal is 
about attorney fees. (ISP/ABC's Response Brief at 3). This is correct 
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Idaho Constitution prohibits· promoting alcohol sales and consumption. 
Article III, Section 24 and 26 of the Idaho Constitution states that that 
"temperance and morality" should be promoted by government, not 
alcohol consumption. An interpretation of a statute or a rule that requires 
sales of alcohol as a condition of licensure would violate this provision of 
Idaho Constitution. 
(Affidavit of Major Thomas Thompson, ,r 6). 
This interpretation of 1DAPA 11.05.01.010.03 stood for fifteen (15) years. Current 
ISP/ABC administrators may be free to change this policy, but they are required to 
promulgate a new or amended rule to. do so. Asarco v. State, 13 8 Idaho 719 (2003 ). 
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Moreover, while ISP/ABC challenges Major Thompson, because the word 
"available" does not appear in the rule, neither do the mandatory words "must" or "shall." 
Nor in IDAPA 11.05.01.101.03 does appear the phrase "one (1) glass of liquor sometime 
during the day that the establishment is open." Director's Final Order at 11. The 
Director ruled that IDAP A was ambiguous. Hence, it must be construed against the 
agency that drafted it. "Some courts have gone so far as to hold that, in suits involving a 
public administrative agency, the rules and regulations of such agency should be strictly 
construed against it. Any ambiguities contained therein shall be resolved in favor of the 
adversary." Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687,691 (1979) (citations omitted). The 
only manner, in which the rule could lawfully have been enforced, absent a new or 
amended rule, is as it had been enforced for many years. See, State v. Hagerman Water 
Right Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 733 (1997) C'where contemporaneous and practical 
interpretation has stood unchallenged for a considerable length of time, it will be 
regarded as very important in aniving at the proper construction of the statute").7 
-r ISP/ABC argues it was improper for Fuchs to state that IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 is "ambiguous, hence 
void." (Respondent's Brief at 5). llcspondent is correct that there is no bright line rule that once a rule is 
declared ambiguous, it is automatically void. However, it is impossible to enforce a. nile that has had no 
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ISP/ABC admits in its briefing before the Court, the agency, and the DirectQr, that 
it changed policy. Rather than promulgate a new or amended rule, it fell to criticizing 
prior administrators. (Respondent's Brief at 5). The Director ruled that IDAPA 
11.05.01.010.03 was ambiguous. The attempt to revoke Fuchs' retail alcohol beverage 
license based upon a rule that had never before been applied as a mandatory rule and 
which has now been tlet.:lared by the Director on review as ambiguous, was without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. This Court should award Fuchs attorney fees pursuant to 
I.C. § 12-117. 
B. ISP/ABC is barred from revoking Fuchs' li~ense based upon quasi-estoppel. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that quasi~estoppel may be invoked against 
. the Department of Law Enforcement (predecessor to ISP), if that government agency 
takes inconsistent positions to a licensee's detriment. Young v. Idaho Dept. of Law 
Enforcement, 123 Idaho 870 (Ct. App. 1993).8 Previous and curre.nt ISP/ABC 
administrators did not require any number of "actual sales." 
ISP/ABC argues, in its persistence and confusion, as it did before the Hearing 
Officer and the Director on review, that the separate and distinct doctrine of "equitable 
estoppel" may not be invoked against a government or public agency functioning in a 
sovereign or governmental capacity. (Respondent's Brief at 8). But Fuchs has not argued 
"equitable estoppel." He argues "quasi-estoppel." The Hearing Officer and the Director 
clear. stanclarcl but has become a moving target. If a statute or rule is ambiguous, the rules of statutory 
construction require that courts will look to long-time agency application of the rule. State v. Hagerman 
Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 733 (1997). Courts construe ambiguities against the drafter. 
lligginson v Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 691 (1979). Col.Ill$ construe ambiguous statutes and rules to 
avoid "unnccessarilyha.rsh CO![sequences." Id. ---~------------
s See also, Terrazaz v, Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193 (2009); Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for 
fodicial Review Bt pp. 23-27 for fuli discussion of the doctrine of quasi-cstoppel and its application to this 
case. 
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each acknowledged the distinction. "Fu_chs argues the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, not 
equitable estoppel. While very similar, there is a difference between these two 
principles." Director's Final Order at 13. ISP/ABC's entire response to Fuchs' assertion 
of quasi-estoppel is based upon a wrong theory not before the Court. 
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Further, ISP/ ABC argues that it cannot be estopped by misstatements of law made 
by ISP administrators and employees. "Appellant cannot estop the state through those 
mistaken statements of law." (Respondent's Brief at 9) (citing Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. 
State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 138 (2000)). Kelso was an equitable estoppel case, not 
one based upon quasi-estoppel. It has no application here. Nevertheless, previous 
administrators made no mistakes oflaw. Mr. Gould, Captain Rankin and Major 
Thompson, the state administrators responsible for enforcement ofIDAPA 
11.05.01.O10.03, 9 were the final arbiters of agency policy during their tenure. See, I.C. § 
23-903. They read the rule and applied it to require any number of "actual sales." 
ISP/ABC did not promulgate a new or amended rule to change it. 10 
ISP/ABC concedes that it has taken inconsistent positions. It now claims 
previous and current administrators were inept and wrong. Since ISP/ ABC lmew it was 
changing policy, and should have known it was doing so illegally, it acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. This Court should award Fuchs attorney fees and costs 
pursuanttol.C. § 12-117. 
9 See, Gould Affidavit at ,r 2; Rankin Affidavit at 1[2; Thompson Affidavit at 12. 
10 Ironically. ISP/ABC has made misstatements of law in these 1'!0C~~J!tgs. ~Jta,rgued to the H~g 
~~Officer· aii,fi:o the Director tbatFuchs was required to make multiple, hourly sales of liquor by the drink to 
satisfy the rule. (Exhibit R-8). The Director only aru:iounced in his new interpretation in bis Final Order, 
that one (1) slass ofJiquor must be soid per day to satisfy the rule. Director's Final OnJ~r at 11. 
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C. ISP/ABC engaged in improper ru.lemaking, 
While ISP/ ABC argues that it did not engage in improper rulemaking, "[t]he 
Director engaged in lawful, thoughtful, rational and reasoned statutory rule construction." 
(Respondent's Brief at 9), this is not the rulemaking which Fuchs challenged. He 
defended against the illegal rulemaking alleged in the administrative complaint for 
revocation or forfeiture brought again.st him. The Director's new rulemaking, again 
likely unlawful, is not at issue here. Jn any case, the Director should not have engaged in 
"statutory rule construction" with regard to the rule against Fuchs in the complaint. The 
rule applied in the complaint wasv--ambiguous. It was incumbent upon the Director to 
amend or repeal the rule. If he chose to depart from prior enforcement of agency policy, 
he was required to promulgate a new rule or rule amendment. Since he did not do so, 
ISP/ABC's actions were without a reasonable basis in fact or law. This Court should 
award Fuchs attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. 
ISP/ABC admits that it has changed policy. It disparages past ISP/ABC 
administrators and the manner in which they enforced IDA.PA 11.05.01.010.03. In a 
memorandum before the Hearing Officer, ISP/ABC claimed that Mr. Gould, Captain 
Rankin, Major Thompson and ISP Officer Donald Otto were in ''dereliction of their duty 
to enforce the law." (Complainant's Response·to Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Continued Objection to and Motion to Strike Evidence of ABC's Past 
Practices filed October 23, 2009). 
ISP/ABC admits, further, that the current bureau chief, Lt. Clements, did not 
require "·actual sales," when he investigated Fuchs' Nampa licensed premises in 2005, 
relating to issues which did not result in administrative action. ISP/ABC att1:mpts to 
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blame its decision to not require actual sales in 2005 on lack of manpower: 
In hindsight, if Lt. Clements had sufficient staff and resources, Fuchs 
should have been asked to forfeit those licenses back to the state for 
failure of actual use as the law requires, and if he refused to do so as in the 
present case, Lt Clements would have sought revocation. 
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(Complainant's Response to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Continued Objection to and Motion to Strike Evidence of ABC's Past Practices filed 
October 23, 2009 at 16, citing Affidavit of Robert Clements in Response to Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1 18). 11 
A state agency must promulgate a new or amended rule if it seeks to change 
policies that affect the public. Asarco v. Seate, 138 Idaho 719 (2003). Since ISP/ABC 
failed to do so prior to filing this action, its continued attempts to revoke Fuchs' license, 
based upon an ambiguous rule, the application of which was changed retroactively, was 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. This Court should award attorney fees to Fuchs 
pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. 
D. ISP/ABC's actions are an unreasonable exercise of police power. 
ISP/ABC does not respond to Fuchs' argument that its conduct has been an 
unreasonable exercise of police power. Yet, ISP/ABC admits that it never required 
"actual sales" prior to this action. (Donesley Mf.; E~hibit R-3). 12 ISP/ ABC admits that 
11 ISP/ABC's attempt at blaming lack of manpower is refuted by its own Administrative Violation Notice. 
ISP knew how many sales Fuchs bad made at each of these four bars. (Exhibit R-4). ISP identifies how 
many sales were in the Incident Report attached to the Administrative Violation Notice. (Exhibit R·DF-6). 
ISP had obtained all of the necessary evidence it would have needed to pursue a revocation of Fuths' s 
"Nampa licenses. The only logical inference that can be made from ISP's decision not to do so is that 




2 _,,.F3lchs.n_que6ted in discove,:y that ABC identify other ca_ses where it had sought to forfe1t or revoke a 
---
license for failure to make actual sales in the first six (6) months. ABC only identified one other1 currently 
pending action against Bill and Lynn's Back:room. (Complainant's Response to Interrogatory No. 19) 
(Donesley Aff.; Exhl"bit R-3). This interrogatory response wa.s subjt:cl Lo a motion to compel. In response 
t0 the Motion, in the telephone conference with the Rearing Officer, ABC affumatively stated that this was 
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it filed this administrative proceeding without knowing what number of "actual sales" it . 
would require of any licensee, specifically Fuchs. "Probably more than one drink. It's 
plural." (Deposition of Robert Clements, Exhibit R-8, at pp. 35-36). It does not dispute 
that five different standards have been enunciated since this action has been :filed.13 
ISP/ABC's actions have been an unreasonable exercise of police power. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that, "[a]lthough a liquor license is a 
privilege and not a property right; the licensing procedure cannot be administered 
arbitrarily." Crazy Horse, Inc. v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 762, 765 (1977) (citations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that arbitratY administration of liquor licensing is an 
unreasonable exercise of police power. O'Connorv. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 43 
(1949); Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386, 392 (1963). 
The most concrete example ofISP/ABC's arbitrary and capricious enforcement of 
IDAPA 11.05.0L0I0.03 is its inconsisumt treatment of Daniel Fuchs. In 2005, Fuchs 
had less sales of alcohol at his four Nampa bars th.an he did at Aubrey's House of Ale 
alleged in this case. For example, Chelsea Bug's Bar (Nampa) reported total sales for a 
two month period of $63.18. (Donesley A.ff.; Exllibit R-4). Aubrey's House of Ale 
(Coeur d'Alene) reported sales for a three month period of$ 598.11. (Fuchs Aff.; 
the onJy other case involving a premise in which ABC had alleged a licensee failed to fulfill the actual sales 
requirement. (Complainant's Objection to Respondent's Motion to Compel Discovery and forBolargement 
ofT:ime and for Telephonic Hearing on Oral Argument at 8). 
13 The five intexpret.ations are as follows: (1) the original interpret.ation that the rule was non-mandatory. 
(Major Thomas Thompson Affidavit at 11114-6) (Denise Rogers Affidavjt at 114); (2) Lt. Clements' 
interpretation: multiple hourly aales, eight (8) hours a day, six (6) days a week. (Robert Clements 
Deposition, Euibit R-8); (3) the Hearing Officer's intc:rp.mation: "actual~ sales of liquor sometim~ while 
-1tbe bcenseeJis m operation for eight hours a day/no fewer than six days a week." Preliminary Order at 15; 
(4) the Director's interpretation: "six (6) sales a week." Director's Final Order at 11; (5) the Director's 
alternate interpretation which be then rejected, "one (I) sale a week.'' Id. at 10. 
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Exh.ibitR-DF-17, 18).14 ABC did not seek forfeiture or revocation of any of Fuchs' 
Nampa licenses or allege in any administrative action or otherwise that he did not make 
sufficient "actual sales.'' (Donesley Af'f.; Exhibit R-4). 
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Because ISP/ABC's conduct was an urtreasonable exercise of police power, it was 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Fuchs should be awarded attorney fees and 
costs pursuantto I.C. § 12-117. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
ISP/ABC has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. It changed policy 
withourfollowing formal rulemaking procedures. It filed this action not knowing the 
number of "actual sales'' it sought to enforce. The Director ruled that IDAPA 
11.05.01.010.03 was ambiguous. Consequently, without a reasonable basis in fact or law 
for ISP/ABC attempted to require "actual sales" when it filed this administrative 
proceeding. This Court should award attorney fees to Fuchs pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. 
DATED this 26 day ofNovember 2010. \) \ 
(~. --~ U~·-u c'-., 
Brian Donesley 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
14 Jok:jn' Jacobs Bar reported total sales of $110.03 to the Idaho Tax Commission for the period from 
November l to December 31, 2004. Brooke's Bar reported total sales of $68.18 to the Idaho Tax 
Commission for the period from November l to De~cember 3-1, 2004. Chelsea Bug's Bai:- reponed total ___ _ 
sales of $63.18 to the Idaho Tax Commission for the period from November 1 to December 31, 2004. 
Rocltin' Ryans reported total sales of $30 .18 to the Idaho Tax Commission for the period from November l 
to December 31, 2004. (Donesjey Aff.; Exhibit R-4). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26 day of November, 2010, I caused an 
accurate copy of the foregoing document to be delivered as noted below to: 
Lawrence G. Wasden. Attorney General 
Stephanie A. Altig, Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, Idaho 83642-6202 
U.S. Mail: 
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U:CISUTURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 15 
First Rf8Uiar Session - 19'1 
\ 
BY JUDICIARY, RULES AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
1 A CONCUWNT RESOLUTION 
2 AUTHORIZING AND DIRECTING THE ~ECISLAIIVE COUNCIL TO APPOINT A COMMITTEE TO 
3 UNDERTAKE AND COMPLETE A STUDY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT. 
4 Be It R~solved by the Legislat~re of the State of Idaho: 
S WHEREAS, the Administrative Procedures Act contained in Chapter 52, Title 
6 67, Idaho Code, was first enacted in 1965; and 
1 WHEREAS, the Administrative Procedures Act was amended by the passage of 
8 House Bill No, 529 in 1990 which related to legislative oversight of adminis· 
9 trative rules and was interpreted in 1990 by the Idaho Supreme Court in the 
10 case of Mead v. Arnell; and 
11 WHEREAS, the Mead v. Arnell case upheld the Legislature's authority to 
12 reject rules and regulations p~oiaulgated by the executive ·branch of govern-
13 ment; and 
14 WHUEAs, the p~oblem of notice foT propoeed t'Ulee undeT the Administra-
15 tive Procedures Act is one that both state agencies and persons OT entities 
16 regulated by rules and regulations seem to struggle with; and 
17 WHEREAS, cha 110rld, Idaho and 1tate government have changed greatly since 
18 1965 and an examination of the Administrative Procedures Act is in order to 
19 modernize it, 111.!lke it more.efficient a0d have it better serve the aeeds of the 
2Q people 0£ the scate a, well as agencies of state government, 
21 NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the members of the First Regular Session 
22 of the Fifty-first Idaho Legislature, the House of RepTesentatives and the 
23 Senate concurring therein, that the Legislative council is authorized and 
24 directed to appoint a twelve person co111D.ittee, uith ei~ members from the Sen-
25 ate and six members from the House of Representatives, to undertake and com-
26 plece a study of the Administrative Procedures Act with emphasis given to leg-
27 islative oversight of administTative rule, and Che general procedure of aow 
28 rules get promulgated and notice is given to and received by the public, In 
29 conducting this study, the Conmittee sh.all consult with the directors or 
30 aclmi~iatrative heads of etate agencies and institutione, and the private, pub-
31 lie entities and persons who are impacted by or regulated by administrative 
32 nles and the general provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. 
33 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Committee shall report it& {indinge, rec-
34 onmendations and proposed legislation, if any, co the Second Regular Session 
3S of the Fifty-fir~t Idaho Legislature. 
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Legislative Council 
Committee on Administrative Pro~eaures 
Senate Caucus Room 
Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 
October 29, 1991 
MINUTES 
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October - 3 8 7 
The meeting was called to order at 9 a.m. by Cochairman 
Senator Vance. other members in attendance were Cochairman 
Representative Simpson, Senator& Donesley, Hawkins, Kerrick, 
McLaughlin, and Wetherell, and Representatives Pete Black, Duncan, 
and Loveland. Representative Adams was absent and excused. 
l\ep:resente.tive I:ofanger was absent. Staff in attendance were 
Schlechte and Wood. 
Others in attendance were Representatf ve Loertscher; Carl 
Oleson and Bob Fry, State Tax Couunission; Dale Goble, Mike Gilmore, 
Jack McMahon, Korey Lowder, and Michael De.Angelo, Attorney 
Genera1's Task Poree; Paul Pusey, Boise; Jon Carter, Governor's 
Office; Woody Richards, Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock,.and F1elds; 
Reagan Davis and Dick Rush.. Idaho Association of Commerce and 
Industry; and Bob c. Hall# Idaho Newspaper Association. 
Mr. Jack McMahon, Deputy Attorney General, Attorney Genera1's 
Office, stated that Attorney General Larry EchoHawk made it a 
priority of bis office to review·the Administrative Procedures Act 
{APA) for state agencies. He said through the courtesy of the 
cochairmen of this committee, the decision was made to allow the 
Attorney General's Task Force to go forward and draft a document 
covering all the APA excepting the legislative oversight 
provisions. 
Mr. McMahon stated the Task Force started meeting 1n April and 
inc1udes ma.mbera rapresent:ing the state agencies, the private 
sector, and local government, and five legislators representing 
hoth parties in the House and Senate. He said the Task Force was 
divided into three groups: i:-ulemaking, contested oases, ancl 
publication of rules. He said these CODUl.littees met periodically 
throughout the e'U.1'11.D\er, and by late summer had put together a first 
draft which has been mailed to attorneys and othe.r interested. 
parties throughout the state for their review and comment. 
Mr. McMahon sa1d the comments received have been integrated 
into the attorney general' c draft doc'UDlent. The oommi ttee has also 
met with the Idaho Association of Commerce and Indust~y 1 s legal 
advisory team, private sector attorneys, 20 deputy attorneys 
general , and key contacts in the media inasmuch as one of the 
provisions in the draft is of _ _J;_erious conce:rn to the media. He-- -----· 
szUcr the cl:ra'fi:1S now in two different forms, one Of Which iS in 
legislative format drafted .by Legislative Council. The other, 
drafted by Professor Dale Goble, University of Idaho college of 
Law, varies slightly and contains comments after each section. 
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~rofessor Goble stated that there is a perception that 
agencies aot on the basis of secret law. He said the draft, 
attempts to make agency actions and proceedings more op8n to the 
public. The creation of the Idaho Administrative Bulletin and the 
Idaho Administrative Code in the draft are steps in that direction. 
He continued that the public notice requirements in rulemaking have 
been expanded and the time limits for interim legislative review 
have been extended to increase the public participation. 
Professor Goble said the second thing they tried to do is 
•regularize• what agencies are doing. They tried to look at the 
kinds of things that agencies currently are doing, figure out liow 
many different kinds of things there were, and then specify the 
procedures for those kinds of things. He said this is particularly 
true in contested cases. 
Professor Goble said the third thing they tried to do is to 
keep it simple and informal. He said a nwnber of people coJD111entin9 
on the initial draft ·said, 11 Don't make it very complicated." He 
said people indicated they want it so that individuals can go to 
an agency to try and solve their prol:>lem·s without having to involve 
an attorney, Professor Goble said all the way through they have 
attempted to do that. For example, he said they have encouraged 
agencies to engage in negotiated rulema~ing. They have attempted 
to give flexibility so that agencies ean formally negotiate 
contested case problems. 
Professor Goble said the APA is divided into five general 
sections, four of which were a part of the model APA. and the 
fifth, Legislative Review, from current law. 
1. General Provisions 
Professor Goble said the first section deals with a number of 
general provisions that are applic~ble throughout the Act. He said 
in reviewing definitions, three of those definitions tie into one 
another and are of particular importance. The first is the 
definition of agency action. Most of the judicial review 
provisions in the Act are tied into the idea that agency action is 
subject to judicial reviewJ therefore, the definition of. agency· 
action tends to be a trigger for judicial review . 
. Professor Goble said the second ana third definitione a.re 
11 order 11 and "rule,u ffe said the two primary things that agencies 
do are to either issue orders following a contested case, or adopt 
a rule following a rulemaking. 
Professor Goble said the second major thing contained in 
general provisions is the creation of the office of Adminietrative 
Rules Coordinat~!'_. The Rule~__l;_Q9:i:Jlinat0.1:__wilLoe .responsible for ---
the publication of two documents: the Idaho Administrative 
Bulletin to be published biweekly and contain notices of proposed 
2 
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rulemaking; and the Idaho Administrative Code to be published 
annually and contain all final rules promulgated by an agency. The 
bulletin will be widely distributed throughout the state and will 
be available in libraries around the state. It will also be 
available in subscription form. 
2 • · Rulemaking 
Professor Goble said there are relatively few changes in the 
rulemaking provisions from the current statJJte. He said one of the 
changes is found is Section 67-5220 where an additional step is 
added at the beginning of the process to have agencies notify the 
public of their intent to promulgate a rule, tbe idea being that 
the earlier the public is given notice, the better. Professor 
Goble said the notice of intent is the voluntary step designed to 
get notice out to the public and to encourage agency decision 
making to be as open as possible. 
Professor Goble said Sections 67-5221 through 67-5224 set out 
four mandatory procedures that an agency is required to go through 
to promulgate rules. The agency has to publish a notice in the 
bulletin that contains a wide range of information including the 
te~t of the propoeed rule. Concurrent with the publication in the 
bulletin, notification goes to the legislature. The legislative 
$Ubcouunittees have an opportunity to hold a hearing on the rule if 
they choose to do so. In the third step, the public also has an 
opportunity to make comment on the proposed rule, including the 
opportunity to require some kind of an o.ral presentation. The 
final step in the process is that the agency is required to publish 
a statement including the reasons for and an explanation of the 
rule in conjunction with publishing the final rule in the bulletin. 
Professor Goble said in order to facilitate judicial review 
of the process, Section 67-5225 requires the agency to put together 
a record in conjunction with the rulema.king proceee. He said the 
current statute provides for emergency rules. Section 67-5226 of 
this proposal somewhat expands the kinds of rules that can be 
promulgated by authorizing the agencies to promulgate temporary 
rules in certain circumstances. If an agency proposes to change 
a rule to comply with changes in federal law, then it can do so 
through a temporary rule while it promulgates a final rule. If the 
agency 1s conferring a benefit, then it can do so through an 
emergency rule fol1owed by a final rule. He said it was felt that 
in both of those situations we wouldn't run the risk of cutting off 
people's rights. Professor Goble said one safeguard w1 th a 
temporary rule is that it only lasts for a maximum of 27 weeks. 
Professor Goble stated that in order . to determine when 
government actions are going to happen, all the way through the APA 
they attempted to change time f.rames ove~_ to muJ_J:A~!~of seven ___ _ 
aays. He. saTc.f--loriger numbers are specified in terms of weeks; the 
shorter numbers a.re specified in multiples of seven days. 
3 
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3. contested cases 
Professor Goble stated that contested cases are those 
situations in which the agency action affects an individual' a 
rights or responsibilities. As a result, these provisions are the 
most intricate, interrelated, and complex provisions of the Act. 
He said they attempted to find common problems that confront 
agencies in contested cases, and essentially found that there are 
five different models in things that agencies dia. He said they 
then attempted to draft law that captured those five things. One 
of the major distinctions between the five things is whether or not 
the agency head makes the initial decision. He said in a couple 
of situations the agency head will make the initial decision. In 
the other three situations, somebody other than the agency head, 
generally a hearing officer, will make the first decision in the 
agency. He said there is then the possibility in the latter three 
of some kind of internal ·appeals process and that tends to be what 
separates out the five diffe~ent groups. 
Representative Duncan stated that he was somewhat concerned 
with the wording 1n 67-5240 as far as making the transition from 
the nrulemaking,. prooess to the "contested cases" p.rocess; i.e., 
"a contested case is governed by the provisions of this chapter." 
The chapter will be Chapter 52 -- so would that mean that contested 
cases would be governed by some of the things in prior sections 
dealing with rulemaking? Ne asked how we would stop that 
conclusion from happening? 
Professor Goble responded that it is covered by this chapter 
in the sense that the definition provisions in the first part of 
the Act apply here, and the judicial review provisions in the last 
part of the Act apply here as well. He said he thought it would 
be possible to go through and specify ths various sections. 
Representative Duncan said he wondered if there would be a 
conflict with 0 one of those guys with a black robe, 11 who would 
somehow use one of the rulemaking proceedings that doesn't 
specifically start out by saying "this only applies to rulemaking, • 
and come up here with some sort of ambiguity or contradiction 
between contested cases.· 
Mr. McMahon said the document should be worded so carefully 
that that will never happen. He said it's a challenge we should 
accept. He said agency actions are either rules or orders, 
ru1emaki·nge or contested cases, and the vocabulary has been done 
so carefully that rulemaking provisions, even though they are part 
of this chapter too, should never be capable of confusion in a 
contested case arena. Mr. McMahon said we should make perfectly 
sure of that. 
-l?.ro-fessor Goble said if an agency tries to do something to a 
particular person or a small, particularly identified group of 
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individuals, by definition that's an 04der, and by definition you 
can only do an order th~0u9h a contested case. He said we've tried 
to draw the line between general legislative rulemaking and 
individual contested case order. 
Senator Donesley questioned when does the specificity break 
down an4 an order become a rule? Professor Goble responded that 
any ti~e you try to draw a line there's a gray area where the two 
meet. He ·said orders tend to be directed toward e~ents· that 
occurred in the past1 whereas a rule tends to look to the future. 
In response to a question by Senator Doneeley, Professor Goble said 
under both the rulemaking and the contested case provisions 1 
there's the opportunity to seek declaratory judgment. · 
Mr. McMahon said that sometimes agencies get ·in the middle of 
a case and they say, "Gee, this is a good policy for this person; 
we want this policy to start governing everything we do for all 
the other people that we•xe going to deal with.• He said that in 
section 6 7-52 50 1 Indexing of Pracedential Agency Orders, we've 
said, 11 You can't do that unless you either make it into a rule, or 
index that opinion and keep it available." Everyone would then 
know that from then on that policy was established and the agency 
was going to rely on it from now on. 
senator Donesley said from a practical matter in some agencies 
there are informal memos, guidelines, opinions, and enforcement 
guidelines -- will these be permissible under these rules? .Are 
they prohibited, such that they.have no effect unless promulgated 
lawfully, or have we addressed that iss~e at all? 
Frofessor Goble said we didn't address that issue specifically 
and it is probably impossi.ble to get away from having such 
documents. But, if we try to say that 1o1e have to publish them all, 
maybe it will require a phone call to determine the agency policy. 
He said when they were at IACI they heard similar concerns that 
agencies have such internal guidance documents. Nobody could find 
out what they were, and they would really like to see something in 
there about having internal guidance documents, much like the 
precedential orders. 
Mr. Michael DeAngelo1 Attorney General's Task Force, stated 
that according to 67-5249·, these things are required to be placed 
in the record, so they must be available as part of the oonteeted 
case record. When balancing that with 67-5250, the intent is that 
we can't uee anything as precedent or binding unless it's indexed 
and available for public inspection. 
Profeeeor Goble said the other difference is that if an agency 
goes through the process of promulgating a policy as a regulation, 
then the regulation itself has the force __ _i!nd Qffec~J).f_____l_a_w. ~. The 
age~-cy-tnen doesrP~ have to prove that it, s valid in subsequent 
contested cases. He said that's where one starts from, just as 
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though it were statute. But, if there is an internal guidance 
document that's never promulgated, then every time the agency wants 
to use that, it has to establish that the policy itself corresponds 
to the statute. He said if the agency promulgates a rule, it gains 
via-a-vie judicial review.· If it chooses not to, then the internal 
guidance document does not have·the force and effect of law. 
Mr. Mike Gilmore, Attorney General's Task Force, stated the 
purpose of this Act is to stop agencies from using informal 
internal guidance documents and to give supervising attorneys a 
clear statement from the legislature that this has to stop. He 
said the requirement in this Act is that if it's not written and 
promulgated as a rule, it can't be used. 
~r-ofessor Goble said there are five models of contested cases. 
He said the first kind of thing that agencies do is issue a notice 
of violation or a complaint. The most common occurrence when a 
notice of violation is issued 1s that the person who receives it 
will say, "Yeah, you caught me, here's the penalty, 11 and that will 
be the end of it. Notices of violation are treated aa one form of 
informal disposition of a contested case. He said if the person 
who receives the notice of violation objects to the notice, they 
can trigger a contested case. They have the authority to go in and 
request a full hearing before the agency on the matter. Professor 
Goble said there doesn't have to be a contested case to issue a 
notice of violation. The inspector can go out and issue the notice 
of violation. If the person does not contest the notice of 
violation, he can pay the penalty and there is no need to go 
through a full procedure, but we give the option to the person who 
receives the notice of violation to initiate the process. That's 
the first model. 
Professor Gobie said the second _and third models are 
situations in which the hearing is held by a hearing officer. The 
difference between the two is whether or not the order becomes 
final without the head of the agency having done anything. He said 
one recurrent factual pattern is that the hearing officer hears 
the case and prepares a recommended decision. That recommended 
decision does not become final until it goes to the board and a 
decision is made. 
Professor Goble said the other similar model is where a 
hearing officer hears the case and renders a preliminary order. 
That preliminary order then becomes final unless one of the two 
parties to the hearing requests a hearing before the agency head. 
Therefore, when you have a recommended o~der, the order doesn't 
become final until the agency head acts, With a preliminary order, 
it becomes final unless there is a request for administrative 
review of the matter. Professor Goble said then there are final 
orders, situations where the agency head will actually do..... the ___ _ 
hearing and will make the decision. 
6 
Daniel Fuchs vs ISP SC 38714-2011 Page 90 of 132 
11/25/2010 16: 18 20834341P DONESLEY LAW OFFT~ PAGE 27/38 
October - 393 
Professor Goole said ese four types of orders follow the 
same procedures as set out n Section 67-5242. There are no real 
significant changes in this section; it is essentially the way it 
is done now. Professor Go le sa1d the fifth type of order, the 
emergency order, bas a sep rate procedure and is designed for a 
small number of situations n which there ie a pressing threat to 
public health or safety. H said in such situations an expedited 
procedure is available for ssuing an emergency order. 
Professor Goble said th remaining provisions in the contested 
case materials are essent · ally housekeeping and there are no 
significant changes in there. One chanse that goes along with the 
idea of reducing the range f secret law has to do with agenciea 
taking official notice, whi his found at 67-5251. If an agency 
proposes to take official n tice, all. parties must be notified to 
allow them a reasonable oppo tunity to contest and rebut the facts, 
The agency will not be allow d to ushove documentsh at the opposing 
side; they'll have to have staff person bring the document with 
them and be available tote tify as to the docu~ent. 
4, Judicial Review o Agency Action 
Professor Goble said he only significant change in the 
judicial review provieions was to make them applicable to 
ru.lemaking a1:1 well as to con ested cases. In the current statute, 
the judicial review provisio s app1y only to contested cases. He 
said reviewing courts, as a esult, have scrambled around •pulling 
l)its and pieces from here a there" trying to come up with a way 
of reviewing rulemakings. 
Professor Goble said th other thing they did was to take one 
very, very long section and ivide it up into separate steps, and 
give each of the separates eps a title. He said it now appears 
that there's a whole bunch f sections where there was only one 
section before; :but es sent· aliy, the one big section was just 
divided into smaller section. 
Senator Oonesley stated that internal personnel policiee are 
required by statute and by ule of the Personnel commission. He 
said they do affect private r ghts. Following discussion regarding 
whether or not internal pez: onnel policies of agencies should De 
made part of the APA, Senato Donesley agreed that they should not 
oe because they would only clutter up the Administrative Code. 
However, Senator Donesley s id that he wae concerned allout the 
wording con'tained in the definition of "rule• in section 
67-5201(16)(1) where it sta es • ..• not affecting private ri9bts 
or procedures available to the public. 11 In order to make the 
language very clear, Senator Donesley requested that it be changed 
to 11 ••• not affecting priva rights of the public or procedures 
available to_ t]'l_e public. 11 _______ _ ____ --~--·· _ 
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In response to a request by Representative Simpson, Professor 
Goble reviewed the proposed establishment of an office of 
administrative rules coordinator. He said the coordinator will be 
responsible for publishing the Administrative Bulletin biweekly 
and the Administrative Code annually. These publications are to 
be widely distributed throughout the state. The following 
documents shall be published in the Administrative Bulletin: 
1. All proclamations and executive orders of the governor, 
except those that have no general applicability or are 
effective only against state agencies or persons in their 
capacity as officers, agents, or employees thereof, 
2. Agency notices of intent to· promulgate rules, notices of 
proposed rules, and the text of all proposed and final 
rules together with any explanatory material supplied by 
the agency. 
3. All documents .requi~ed by law to be published in the 
bulletin. 
4. Any legislative documents affecting a final agency rule. 
Profeaeo.r: Goble said the focus is prima.rily on the publication 
of documents related to the promulgation process itself. He said 
there are essentially three steps in that publication prooess. The 
first one is a voluntary one (Section 67-5220). If the agency 
chooses it may publish a notice of an intent to p.romulgate a rule. 
Pzofessor Goble said the first mandatory step in the process ia set 
out in 67-5221, Public Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The agency 
1s required to publish a notice in the bulletin which sets out 
eight items that are required to be published: 
1. The specific statutory authority for the rulemaking. 
2. A statement in nontechnical language of the substance of 
the proposed rule. 
3, A concise nontechnical explanation of the puz-pose of the 
proposed rule. 
4. The text of the proposed ruie prepared in legislative 
format. 
s. The location, date, and time of any Public hearings the 
agency intends to hold on the proposed rule. 
6. The manner in which- persons shall make written comments 
on the proposed rule, including the name and address of 
a person in the agency __ t:o whom comments _c:,n the proposal 
- ---shan: be sent. 
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7. The manner in which persons may request an opportunity 
for an oral presentation as provided in Section 67-5222, 
Idaho Code. · · 
8. The deaoline for public comments on the proposed rule. 
Pro.fessor Goble said the initial publication contains two 
types of information: one, information about the rule itself; and 
two, information about how to become involved in commentinq on the 
rule. The rule then goes out for public comment. The agency is 
required to g1ve at least 21 days for public comment. Professor 
Goble said then the%e is the public participation period which is 
concurxent with the interim legislative review period. · 
Mr. McMahon said under the current law oftentimes the 
legislative review committees end their xeview proceedings long 
before the oomment period. has expired and the agency is still 
receiving comment. The new proposal makes sure the legislature 
can always hold a hearing aft•r all the public colM\ent has been 
received rather than when it's still coming in. 
Professor Goble said the final etep is publication of the 
final rule ( 67-5224). :Basically what is required he::re is a 
statement of the reasons and justifications for adopting the rule, 
plus a statement of any change that was made ~etween the proposed 
text and the final text. 
Professor Go:ble said on an annual ba.eis all the rules that 
have been pub1ishe4 in final form in the bulletin will be compiled 
into a codification called the Administrative Code. In reaponse 
to a question Dy Representative Simpson, Professor Goble said it 
will also be available through electronic means and will be 
available to those who want to subscribe to it. 
Mr. McMahon stated that when the office of administrative 
rules coordinator is created, it will be effective July 1992. The 
Act itself would not take effect until July 1993, so for a year 
there will be start up costs necessary for this office before it 
ean start billing the ageneiee·for aoing the work inasaucb as it 
won't be doing the work; it will be creating a data base and 
getting all the existing agency regulations onto the computer. 
After July 1993, this office will be self-supporting. 
Mr. McMahon said this position was put in the office of the 
Governor. He said there is nothing sacred in this decision and 
that it was a "flip of the ooin" sort of thing because it could 
just as well be placed in the Secretary of State's office, the 
State Law Library, or in the Auditor's office. He said some states 
place it in the Attorney General's office. 
·--~·-----c---
----s-enator·riawkins stated that he would like to pursue the public 
notice aspect in the proposed draft. He said many of his 
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constituents ask him, "Why didn't I have notice of this rule?" He 
said by publishing proposed rules in only one place, the 
Administrative Bulletin, we are actually going to constrict the 
public notice rather than expand it. He said he doesn't think that 
the ave:rage citizen of the state is going to be aware or be 
.involved in receiving1 reviewing1 and understanding the bulletin 
all the time. He said even though public notice in the newspapers 
seems to be inadequate, it does seem to be better, broader, and 
more effective than the bulletin. 
Professor Goble said there has been absolute unanimity among 
everyone that he has talked to that the goal is the best notice 
possible at a reasonable.cost. He said everyone he has talked to 
feels that the best way to hide something is to put it in the legal 
section in the Dack of a newspaper. He said if there is a place 
where they are regularly available, and if they are available 1n 
every public library in the state, he feels this is a step ahead. 
Mr. Korey Lowder, Department of Health and Welfare, said he 
is responsible for all the notices of rulemaking in that 
department, and in hie five years of experience, he has found that 
the majo:ity of people that take notico of a ru.lemaking get that 
notice from a direct mailing from the department; they don't get 
it from the newspaper. He said the department usee a direct 
mailing because it realizes that the newspaper publication doesn't 
work inasmuch as no one reads them. 
In response to a question by Senator McLaughlin, Mr. Lowder 
said under the current system, the state is probably spending 25% 
more than it should be spending on publications and mailings. He 
said now they are sending out rules, they are sending out legal 
notices, and it is "shooting hit and miss."- He said the office 
of r~les coordinator will allow the agencies to channel their funds 
into one constructive means and people will have one place to go 
for information on rules and regulations. 
senator McLaughlin asked if there was going to be a charge to 
the private people that wish to have access to the bulletin? Mr. 
Lowder said if they read ~he bulletin in the public library it will 
be free; if not, there will be a charge. Senato·r McLaughlin said 
that causes her concern because not every town in Idaho has a 
public library. She said some people might need to have access to 
this information. but they might not have tbe resources by which 
to obtain it. 
In response to a question by Senator McLaughlin, Mr. Lowder 
said he feels the bulletin will allow more ac.oess to the rules and 
will inform more people than the current process. He also 
responded that sometimes they notify clients of a possible rule 
cha:n_g~ and sometimes they a.on' t. Mr.. D&Angel.O-~--if t.hers is a 
change in level of benefits to Health and Welfare clients, there 
is a notification process, but this is not a part of rulemakin9 
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changes. Mr. DeAngelo stated that he doesn't feel there is any 
kind of system that is going to guarantee that everyone that needs 
and wants to know about a particular issue is goin9 to get that 
notice. 
Senator Hawkins stated that be feels the notice provision in 
the draft proposal is inadequate. He said he does not perceive a 
large percentage of his constituency being awa~e and informed of 
a bulletin and being able to follow it, as compared to what there 
is now. He said he has had a lot of constituents read a legal 
notice in a newspaper and they didn't know if it affected them or 
not, but at least they knew something wae .happening and took the 
initiative then to aake a phone call and find out what was 
happening. 
Representative Simpson said in Section 67-5205 he would like 
to add a provision that one copy of the bulletin be distributed to 
eaoh city hall in addition to one copy being distributed to each 
county clerk. He would also like to add a provision for an aoo 
number in the office of the administrative rules coordinator. He 
said he feels that once p~ople realize that there is a biweekly 
publication that tells them eve~ything they want to know about any 
proposed rule or regulation, there will be a much bigger bene~it 
to the public than there is in a iegal notice in a newspaper. 
Representative Simpson suggested that a notice be placed in 
the newspaper that (a) states that a rule is coming out; and (b) 
contains a gloaea4y which indicates which rules are being proposed. 
He said this way someone could se.e that .the.re were ruie changes 
affecting a particular area. Senator Oonesley said this is a good 
idea and he would support this idea as it would provide an added 
•safety net- for the public. 
Senator Hawkins said be believes public notice of a rule 
change, even though it presently isn't adequate, neede to be a part 
of the promulgation process. He said he really believes that if 
we are going to have public involvement 1n developing rules, we are 
going to have to provide better notice than what we're providing 
now. He said individual people won't have a clue as to what's 
happening to them with regard to regulations until it's too late. 
The committee recessed for lunch at 12!10 p.m. and reconvened 
at 1:30 p.m. 
Senator Donesley expressed concern. about the language in 
Section 67-5242(1)(0) and said he would like to see it changed so 
that it's clear that there must be notice as to facts and gene~ally 
as to applicable law, rather than the existing language alone which 
requires that a notice must include •a statement of the matters 
asserted or the issues involved• inasmuch as he is not clear what 
that language means. He said the reason for this suggestio~is 
that it•s quite simple to give people notiee of what it is that's 
being alleged in a contested case. 
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Mr. McMahon said the policy choice was made to try to strip 
this document down and leave in juet the bare essentials with the 
intention of following it up with a set of model rules for all of 
the agencies to follow. The model rules support this document and 
fill in all the details. He said every agency will have to adopt 
model rules unless they adopt something that's better, something 
that is more thorough and more protective. (Section 67-5206(5). 
Representative Duncan asked about the wording in 67-5240 where 
it seems like the Public Utilities Commission is exempted out of 
providing rules dealing with contested cases. Professor Go~le said 
the PUC is taken out of 67-5240 for a couple of reasons: He said 
what they do formally fits within the definition of a contested 
case, but at the same time it's forward looking which makes it sort 
of like a rulemaking; therefore, the normal contested case 
proceeding doesn't fit a lot of their processes and procedures very 
well. Mr, McMahon said tbe PUC has a very thorough and elaborate 
se~ of rules that are even thicker than this draft and they are 
broken down by type of proceeding. 
Mr. McMahon said it was the intent of the Task Poree that the 
Industrial Commission be included in Section 67-5240, along with 
the Public Ut~lities Commission. and requested that it be added to 
that section. He said the point was made that the Industrial 
Commission has a specific exempt.ion in their statute for their 
judicial rulemakin~ which really is its contested case process, eo 
they have an entire eet of rules that govern how they do contested 
cases. Mr. Schlechte said both the PUC and the Industrial 
Commission have direct appeal to the Supreme Court, so they need 
to be treated somewhat differently. 
Senator Vance stated that at tbis time the committee will 
accept public testimony pertaining to the proposed document. 
senator Mich_ael D. Crapo, I"daho Falls, said that he bas some 
very strong reeervatione about the p~opoaed bill that has been 
presented to the committee. He said his main concern evolves from 
a concern that he has that the citizens of- this state, and most 
other states, ~eel removed from the political process. A part of 
this is caused by the fact that some of the agencies are, to a 
certain extent, becoming those kinds of ·nameless, faceless 
bureaucracies that we associate with Washington, D.C. 
Senator Crape said there is a problem in Idaho. He said the 
political system has grown beyond the control of the average 
citizen in a number of areas, and one of those areas ie the 
Administrative Procedures Act and the interplay of citizens with 
state agencies.· He said nine out of ten of the constituent 
contacts he has concern a problem that a citizen is having with an 
executive ag~ncy. Jie ~aid this makes sens1a becaul;~ t·hat is where 
government really meets the people -- in the ad.ministration of laws 
through the agencies. He said we need a system where the people 
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can intei;:play with the government in a way that ie effective and 
where the people have some power. 
Senator crape said in the 1991 legislature he introduced 
Senate Bill 1006 which would have judicial oversight over agency 
decision making. He said there were other bills also introduced 
that·dealt with the same issue. The Attorney General requested 
that we bold off on those bills inasmuch as he proposed the 
appointment of a task force to review the entire administrative 
procedures process. Senator Crapo said they agreed with this and 
encouraged them to ~ake into consideration some of the feelings 
that we were exp~essing in our proposed legislation, and to some 
extent they have done so. He said the areas he was most concerned 
with have been ignored completely and that is one of the main 
reasons he is concerned about_ this proposed legislation. 
Senator Cxapo said one problem· we have is that there is not 
a tight enough connection between the statutory authority fo.r 
rulemaking and the exercise of rulemaking. He said he has seen a 
lot of rules promulgated where the statutory authority for the rule 
is just a very general statement in the statute. He said somewhere 
in the statute there should be something that essentially eays: 
a Rules may be promulgated by an agency only when specifically 
autho.rized by statute. No rule . shall be valid or enforceaDle 
unlese it is specifically authorized by and falls within the intent 
and scope of statutory law. 11 He eaid the legislature has to quit 
giving agencies the blanket authority to make rules and reguiations 
for some very broad statement of policy. He said we can start this 
process in the Administrative Procedures Act. 
Senator Crapo said he reali%es that the legislature cannot 
write every detail of every law, and there has to be some authority 
for rulemaking, but presently it is way out of balance in terms of 
what we've allowed in this state. He said there should be a nexus, 
but it should be a_rather earefully_and tightly oontrQlled nexus. 
Senator Crapo said the publication of the Administrative Code 
is a fantastic idea. He said be has sometimes spent weeks trying 
to find an agency's regulatory authority, and sometimes he never 
finds it. He said the people in many of the agencies don't know 
where it is. 
Senator Crapo said the proposed legislation and the system we 
are now working under basically have the concept of limited 
judicial review I meaning that the agency gets to decide what 
enforcement action to take. They then bring the enforcement action 
and the enforcement action is handled by an employee of the agency 
o.r a hearing officer who is paid by the agency. After hie decision 
is rendered then a court can review it, but the court cannot review 
any fact issues beyond determining whether the.re• ~--1,.een_ a 
-~ ~ .reasonable basis in the record determined for those factual 
decisions. The court has full review of legal issues. 
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Senator Crapo said the outcome of that is, frankly, that the 
agency is the prosecutor, the judge, the jury, and the executioner. 
He said that is why the people are cynical about not getting a fair 
shake in front of the agencies. One solution in other states has 
been to creAte some kind of an independent adm1.nistrat1VQ law judge 
or a system of administrative law judgeg who are indepQndent. They 
are paid by the state, but they are not paid by the agency. He 
said he does not think this works, and quite frankly he thinks it's 
just another new bureaucracy. 
Senator Crapo said the concept that he has proposed in Senate 
Bill 1006 is to simply takes our old approach but allows the judge 
to take additional evidence if he doesn't feel there• s enough 
evidence from the record before him. The judge is then allowed to 
have a de novo review of the facts and tbe law. He said some 
people feel this will have a monumental impaot on more litigetion 
in the courts. He said he doesn't agree, but if it takes this in 
order to protect the citizens of the state of Idaho in terms of 
giving them empowerment in thei~ dealin9e with the agencies, so oe 
it. 
In response to a question by Representative Loveland, senator 
Crapo said he would be in favor of putting a sunset clause in some 
statutes in order that the legislature would be forced into 
reviewing the statute as well as the rules and regulations. 
Senator Crapo said the very maximull\ amount of legislative 
oversight that is allowed by constitutional law should be written 
into etetute. He said this committee should ~every certain that 
the legislature does not give away one iota of its authority to 
review rules and regulations. He said it should not be limited 
timewise or any other way. The legislature should have the most 
convenient procedures available to it to review the rule.a and 
regulations of the agencies because in one sense the legislature 
is the last resort for citizens who have not been able to get some 
kind of satisfaction in f,ront of an agency. 
Senator Crapo said he was concerned about the definition of 
"provision of law" in the proposed draft wh.ich reads, "'Provision 
of law' means ... an executive order or rule of an administrative 
agency. " He said never in his mind bas he thought that an 
executive order is a provision of law, nor that a rule or 
regulation has the full status of law. He said he waa alarmed that 
this is being placed in the etatute1 because in effect it will be 
elevating those things to the level of law. He said to him a law 
is a statute, not a rule or regulation, although essentially the 
rules and regulations have the effect of law. 
Senator Crapo said with reference to the creation of the 
o£fiee _ of adminietratiye rulee coordinator, he i&------tLot convinced 
that we need to remove this from the state law librarian's office. 
He said he doesn't feel we need to create a new agen~y. He eaid 
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if the legislature has oversight of the rules and regulations, and 
if we do create a new position, then it should be ehe legislature 
that appoints the position. He said it should not be the governor 
and it should not be the code commission. He said if the committee 
does not agree with this, and the governor does appoint the person 
to that position,. then the legislature should at least have advice 
and consent in the Senate. 
Senator Crapo aclclreesed Section 67-5221, Public Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking. He eaid this might be a good place to state 
that we need a specific statutory nexus because it talks about 
identifying specific statutory authority for the rulemaking. 
In Section 67-5222(2), Senator Crapo expressed his concern 
about the language "An opportunity for oral presentation need not 
be provided when the agenoy has no diacretion as to the substantive 
content of a proposed rule .... n He said he is not sure we should 
restrict public participation even in those circumstances. 
Senator Crapo said that Section 67-5224 allows for a rule to 
become final when published., or such other day that's specified.. 
He said in some cases where they're conferring a benefit, there's 
no good reason for delay. He said he also feels that an agency 
could make it effective immediately by simply saying that they were 
conferring a benefit, He said that mayoe in the final analysis 
that concern is not big enough to override the concern that the 
agency does need, on occasion, to be able to act immediately, but 
he saia that this should be looked at very carefully, because the 
way it'e worded there is no limitation on the agency. 
Senator Crapo said that in Section 67-5226, Temporary Rules, 
if an agency finds that it is reasonably necessary to protect the 
public health, safety, or welfare, or reasonably necessary to 
confer a benefit, then they can adopt a temporary rule. He said 
this provision is so broad, that we might as well allow an agency· 
to enact a. temporary rule wheneve.r they want, because that's 
exactly what that provision says. He said either put no limits on 
it, or figure out what we're trying to let happen and define it. 
Senator Crapo said that in Section 67-5231, Time L~mitation, 
it places a statute of limitations on procedural requirements. He 
said if there is a limitation, it should be put at 5 o~ 10 years, 
because frequently a rule has to be in effect and operate for a 
period of years before the public really understands what's 
happening. 
In response to a question by Senator Hawkins relating to 
public notice of rulema.king in a newspaper, Senator Crapo said he 
feels that most people are not going to be aware of the biweekly 
Acilninistrativ~~!hll.,uu;in,._ and the public i~ uaeo to looking in t.he 
legal notice section of the newspaper. He said he realizes there 
is a cost involved if you' re pub_lishing in both places, l:lut again, 
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in terms of fairness of giving true public notice, there should 
. probably be some kind of public notice in the newspapers. He said 
he doesn't feel the entire rule bas to be published in the 
newspaper; that some type of shortened notice in the newspaper 
would probably be adequate. 
Mr. Bob Hall, Idaho Newspaper Association, stated he primarily 
represents community newspapers and does not represent two or three 
of the largest newspapers in the state. M.r. Hall stated that the 
Idaho Newspaper Association is in support of the major thrust of 
the proposed legislation; i.e. , the gathering and publication 
p.rocess of administrative rules and regulations into bo'tb an 
administrative bulletin and an administrative code. He said the 
publishing of legal notices in the newspapers accounts for about 
$500,000 of legal advertising; nevertheless, he feels that 
publishers are wise enough citi2ens to know when a job can be done 
better, at least in terms of codifying ·the rules and collecting 
them in a central place. 
Mr. Hall said the current system of publication of notices in 
the newspapers has failed in notifying the citizens because it's 
a spotty process. He said agencies publish according to a law that 
says only that they have to publish in a newspaper or newspapers. 
It does not say in every county, in every city. He said there is 
no pattern required. Mr. Hall said the goal of this committee 
should :be to achieve the maximum penetration to the highest number 
of people possible at the most effective cost. He said there 
should be at least some ad or a llliUUi message that will penetrate 
at least 70% of the homeowners in a county, 
Mr. Hall said the law should provide for a notice that 
contains an index of which rules and regulations are being changed, 
informs the public of the existence of and what is contained in the 
Administrative Bulletin, and where it can find a copy. He said the 
notice should be published in a newspaper which is the largest or 
most effective in a given county and make sure that it is in every 
county in the state. He said this will break the spotty pattern 
and will not unreasonably increase the cost. 
Mr. Hall said the Idaho Newspaper Association would oppose any 
law tha.t does not substitute some reasonable public notification 
of the promu.lgation of rules. Mr .. Hall presented the committee 
with a sample of a public notice that would be published in 
newspapers prior to the biweekly publication of the Administrative 
Bulletin. see Appendix A. 
Mr. Hall said he is concerned about the language contained in 
Section 67-5205 which states, 11 0ne each to any puhlio library in 
this state which requests a copy from the coordinator." He said 
it should be mandatory that every public l~brarv receive a copy~of 
the--buITefin. He said lt should be mandatory that every city in 
the state receive a copy also. 
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The committee discussed future meetings of the committee. 
Re:1resentative Simpson said at the next meeting the committee 
should add.res s those areas of . concern which individuals have 
discussed today; He requested that members send any proposed 
changes to the draft legislation to the Legislative Council in 
order that they may be made available to the committee. 
The naxt meeting of the committee was scheduled for 
November 12, 1991, in Boise. 
'!'he.re being no further bu~iness, the meeting adjourned at 
3:05 p.m. 
17 
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TM~ ie a aa111ple of tb.e Pl.Ullic notice advertieemant to be re-
qu.izad to be .run in at least one new~paper 0£ dO!U.ll8.J'.\.t oircula-
tion in each county in Idaho to alert the public to tha each 
new ia3ue of ~he Idaho Adm.inist~ative 5ulletin and where they 
can go to study tboae Bulletin$. 
Ad Size: 2 colWlm~ z 5 inche, 
E~timated Annual Co~t to cover all countiee with notice ot 
each new Bulletin issue in 40 in•county newspapers: $50,000.00 
E~timatad 1991 cos~ tor all Rules, Reg nintent to change" and 
hea%ing notices publisbed under current law in 6 daily ne~s-
papers used: s200,ooo.oo 
Source-: Idaho Yewapape:r .Assoeie.tion, tne. 
Daniel Fuchs vs ISP 
Public Notice 
Of New Or Changed 
State Agency Rules 
The followtne public agencies of the State of Idaho 
have filed their intent to propose or promulgate Rulei 
or Regulad008 that would change that agency's open-
tioos aft'ectlng dtl7.ens of this State. 
Dept. or Agency General Subject 
Ash & Game Salmon Fishing · 
Health & Welfare Toxic Waste. Restaurants 
Rewnue & Taxation Sales Tax, Tl'\Jd<er11 
1 HighWays Road signs, Intersections 
Industrial Commission Workmen's Comp Reoords 








Citizens can read the fulle tat of, and related. agency 
proa:dmes on, any of the above proposed rules in the Idaho 
A.dminstra.tive Bulletin. at the following loca.ti.oru: 
Clerk'!i Office, Clearwatt1 County COllJ"tbwN J.1l First St., Oro&o 
Orofino City LJbrary,43 Ea.st Khode8 SL1 Orofino 
Pierce City Libnry, Mam Street, Pierce 
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I. INTRODUCTION. 
On January 6, 2011, this Court convened oral argument on the Petition for Judicial 
Review and Respondent's opposition thereto. Appellant/Petitioner was represented by Brian 
Donesley, Attorney at Law. Respondent was represented by Stephanie A. Altig, Lead Deputy 
Attorney General. for Idaho State Police and its Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau. 
During Respondent's oral argument, Ms. Altig cited to and discussed Duncan v. State 
Board of Accountancy, 149 Idaho 1, 232 P.3d 322 (2010). By Jetter dated January 6, 201 J, this 
Court directed the parties to file a memorandum of law no later than January 27, 2011 
discussing the application of Duncan, after which the Court wiJI take the matter under 
advisement. 
II. DEFERENCE TO AGENCY INTERPRETATION. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently instructed that an agency's interpretation of its 
rules is entitled to deference from the judicjary on appellate review: "The actions of an agency 
like the Board [ of Accountancy] are afforded a strong presumption of validity. [ Cooper v. Bd 
Of Prof I Discipline, 1134 Idaho 449, 454, 4 P32d 561, 566 (2000)). We wilJ defer to the 
Board's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and unsupported by evidence jn the 
record. Id." Dun.can, 232 P .3d at 324. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently set forth the standards and elements that 
support agency deference: 
This Coun may not substitute its judgment for that of the Board. Id The Board's 
decision may be overturned if it: "(a) violate[s] constitutional or statutory 
provisions; (b) exceed[s] the agency's statutory authority; (c) [is] made upon 
unlawful procedure; (d) [is] not supported by substantial evidence on the record as 
a whole; or (e) [is] arbittary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Id. (citing l.C. 
§ 67-5279(3)). Further, the .Board's decision wiJJ be upheld unless the appellant 
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demonstrates that one of his substantia1 rights has been prejudiced. Id (citing I.C. 
§ 67-5279(4)). 
Duncan, 232 P .3d at 324. 
\Vhere an agency interprets a statute or rule, the Court applies a four-pronged test to 
detennine the appropriate JeveJ of deference to the agency interpretation. The Court must 
determine whether: 
(1) the agency is responsible for administration of the rule in issue; (2) the 
agency's construction is reasonable; (3) the language of the ru]e does not 
expressly treat the matter at issue; and (4) any of the rationales underlying the rule 
of agency deference are present. Preston v. Idaho State Tar. Comm 'n, 131 Idaho 
502,504,960 P.2d 185, 187 (1998). 
Duncan, 232 P.3d at 324. 
There are five rationales that underlie the rule of deference: 
(I) that a practical interpretation of the nue exists; (2) the presumption of 
legislative acquiescence; (3) reliance on the agency's expertise in interpretation of 
the rule; ( 4) the rationale of repose; and (5) the requirement of contemporaneous 
agency interpretation. Id at 505, 960 P .2d at 188. 
Duncan, 232 P.3d at 324. "When some of the rationales underlying the rule exist but other 
rationales are absent, a balancing is necessary because all of the supporting rati.onales may not be 
weighted equally. Th.erefore, the absence of one rationale in the presence of others could, in an 
appropriate case, still present a 'cogent reason' for departing from the agency's statutory 
construction ... If one or more of the rationales underlying the ruJe are present, and no 'cogent 
reason' exists for denying the agency some deference, the court shouJd afford 'considerable 
weight' to the agency's statutory interpretation.'' Preston, 13 l Idaho at 5055, 960 P.2d at 188, 
citingJ.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849,862,820 P.2d 1206 1219 
(1.991). 
An agency's interpretation of its rule or statute is considered unreasonable on]y when: 
RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION OF Duncan..,, 
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[it]is so obscure or doubtful that it is entitled to no weight or consideration." 
Preston, 131 Idaho at 505, 960 P.2d at 188 (quoting J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho 
State Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849,862,820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (1991)). Generally, 
we have found agency interpretations reasonab]e unless the agency reJied on 
erroneous facts or law in its detennination. (citations omitted). Normally, this 
Coun defers to the agency interpretation of statutes and rules. See, e.g., Canty v. 
Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 138 Idaho 178, 183, 59 P.3d 983, 989 (2002); Simplot, 
120 Idaho at 863, 820 P.2d at 1220. 
Duncan., 232 P.3d at 325. 
HI. THE FOUR-PRONGED TEST. 
(1) Whether the agency is responsible for administration of the rule at issue. 
There can be no debate that the Director of the Idaho State PoJice is responsible for 
administration of the "actual sales" ru.Je at issue. 
PAGE 05/12 
Under IDAHO Cooe § 67~2901 (4), "The director [ofJdaho State PoJice] shall exercise alJ 
of the powers and duties necessary to carry out the proper administration of the state police, and 
may delegate duties to employees and officers of the state poHce." Under IDAHO CODE § 23-
902(3), "Director" [for purposes of alcohol beverage contro] law] means the Director of the 
Jdaho State Police. 
The Director has the authority to promulgate rules and reguJations for alcohol beverage 
control purposes necessary to carry out the provision ofTdaho Code, Title 23, Chapters 6-14. 
IDAHO CODE§§ 67-2901. 23-932, 23-946(b), 23-1330 and 23-1408. 
For interpretation in the present case are a statute and an administrative ru]e that apply 
to newly issued city priority Jist Ji.quor licenses: 
IDAHO CODE § 23-908(4)- Each new license issued on or after July 1, 1980, shaJl 
be placed into actual use by the original licensee at the time of issuance and 
remain in use for at least six (6) consecutive months or be forfeited to the state 
and be eligible for issue to another person by the director after compliance with 
the provisions of section 23-907, Idaho Code. Such Jiccu.se shaU not be 
transferable for a period of two (2) years from the date of original issuance, 
except as provided by subsection (5)(a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this section. 
RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION OF Duncan.11. 
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(emphasis added). The tenn "actuaJ use~' is not defined in statute, but is in rule: 
IDAPA J 1.05.01.010.03. New Licenses. For purposes of Section 23-908(4), 
IDAHO CODE, a "new licen.se" is one that has become availab]e as an additional 
license within a city's limits under the quota system after July 1, 1980. The 
requirement of Section 23-908(4), Idaho Code, that a new license be placed into 
actual use by the licensee and remain in use for at least six (6) consecutive 
months is sati,!fied if the licensee makes actual sales of liquor h)J the drink during 
ai- least eight (8) hours per day, no fewer than six (6) days per week 
(emphasis added). 
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The Director's authority to promulgate rules is clear. He has interpreted, vja 
administrative ru1e, that the tenn "actual use" as used in IDAHO CODE§ 23-908(4) and the 
interpretation o.fthe language in IDAPA 1.05.01.010.03 that such "actual use" of a newly issued 
city priority Jist liquor license is "satisfied if the licensee m.akes actual sa]es of liquor by the 
drink during at least eight (8) hours per day, no fewer than sjx (6) days per week." In his Final 
Order, the Director further interpreted that this means at least one glass of liquor by the drink 
must be sold on each of the six eight-hour per week days that the establishment is open during 
the first si:x months. 
The first prong is therefore met and supports deference to the Director's interpretation of 
the "actual use'' statute and "actual sales" rule. 
(2) Whether the agen.cy's construction. i.s reasonabJe. 
The Director found that IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 is ambiguous and recognized that it 
needed a proper interpretation. He noted, correctly, that th.e Legislature's pwpose in requiring 
"actual use0 was to discourage speculation jn liq_uor Hcensjng, typified by a person being issued a 
liquor license and then doing essentially little or nothin.g with it until the six-month period had 
expired and the license could be sold at a greatly increased or inflated price. Dit-ector 's Final 
Order, pp 6-7, 
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Next, recognizing that IDAHO Com~ § 23-908( 4) did not define "actual use,)' the Director 
1ooked to IDAPA 11.05.01 .010.03, which exp1icitly, albeit ambiguously, requires "actual sales" 
to be made. Although Respondent relied on affidavits of fonner ABC administrators and 
employees, none of these people's interpretation of the ''actual sales" rule is entitled to any 
deference whatsoever, for two reasons. First, they interpreted the ru1e by improperly adding the 
word "available," as in havjng Jiquor available for sale, to the language of the rule (certainly 
without rulemaking of any kind) as satisfying the rule's actual sales requirement. Secondly, and 
most importantly, none of them ever served as the Director of the Jdaho State Police. None were 
ever the ISP/ABC agency head whose interpretation is entitled to deference. They were simply 
employees of the agency who chose enforce the actual sales requirement as being satisfied of 
liquor by the drink was merely available for sale during the requisite times. 
The Director's Final Order describes his reasoning for interpreting the "actual sales" 
requirement to require at least one liquor by the drink must be sold each day that the 
establishment is open during at least eight (8) hours per day, no fewer than sfa: (6) days per week, 
throughout the first consecutive six month period after the new license issued. 
First, the Director noted that the rule requires "actual sales" of liquor by the drink, 
initially recogni1.ed by the Hearing Officer but subsequently rejected by him in favor of Fuchs' 
argument that merely having liquor by the drink available for sale was sufficient. The Director 
found that the Hearing Officer's construction of the rule not to require any sales ignored the p]ain 
"actual sales'' language of the rule. Director's Final Order, pp. 9-10. 
Second, the Director recognized that reasonable minds could differ in construing the 
language of the rule. He set forth three reasonable ways it could be interpreted and concluded 
that a c'new Hcensee must selJ at least one (1) glass of liquor sometime during the day that the 
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estab1ishment is open." .Director's Final Order, p. 11. He reasoned that this interpretation was 
consistent with the public policy behind IDAHO Cooe § 23-908(4), i.e., that a new license must 
remain in actual use for the first six months after issuance, without im.posi.ng a particularly 
onerous bur.den on the licensee. He concluded that "requiring at least one (1) sale per day is a 
reasonabl.e, obtainable, and objective standard for. determining whether a licensee is serious 
about exercising the use of the license or has some other ulterior. motive, such as speculating in 
the purchase and sale of licenses." Id 
(3) Whether the langlJ!ge of the rule does not expresslx treat the matter at issue. 
Clearly the language of the "actual sales" rule does not expressly treat the matter at issue, 
which is the frequency that actual saJes of Hquor must be made "during at least eight (8) how-s 
per day, no fewer than six (6) days per week." IOPA I 1.05.01.010.03. 
The Director identified three reasonab.le ways that the rule could be jnterpreted. 
Petitioner argued for a fourth way, Le., that having liquor by the drink available for sale during 
the relevant time period was sufficient. That four different possible interpretations were 
identified, even though the Director soundly rejected Petitioner's, is frr.efutable evidence that the 
rule does not expressly treat the matter at issue - the frequency of saJes. 
@Wheth.er any of the rationales underlying the rule of agency deference are present. 
First Rationale: A practic:al in:tem,retation of the rule exists. 
The question here is whether ruJe at i.ssue has a practical interpretation. A practical 
reading of the role, as the Director found, is to require new a city priority Jiguor licensee to sell at 
least one (1) sale per day, as that requirement "is a reasonable, obtainable, and objective standard 
for detennining whether a licensee is serious about exercising the use of the license or has some 
-other ulterior motive, such as speculating jn the purchase and sale of Jicenses" because "[w]ith 
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extremely minimal advertising and effort, Fuchs, or any other licensee, can promote his business 
and achieve at least one (1) sale every day that he is open." Director '.5' Final Order, p. 11. The 
first rationale is therefore met. Presron, l 3 J Idaho at 505, 960 P .2d at l 88. 
Second Rationale: The presum.ption of legislative acguiescence. 
The genesis of the current conflict derives from IDAHO CODE§ 23-908(4), which requires 
newly issued city priority list licensees to put those licenses into "actual use" for the first 
consecutive six months after issuance. The ru.Je at issue demonstrates that the legislature acted 
beyond "something more than mere silence" as to the construction of that statute. Preston, 131 
Idaho at SOS, 960 P.2d at 188. In this case, the "something more" to determine legisJativc intent 
went beyond mere siJence or reenacting IDAHO CODE§ 23-908(4)'s "actual use" requirement. 
Preston, 131 Idaho at 506, 960 P.2d at 189. The Legislature instead approved IDAPA 
1 l.OS.01.010.03, with its ''actua1 saJes" requirement, with the intent to clarify the meaning of 
"actual use," IDAHO CODE.§ 67-5291, which has now been subject to the Dir.ector's agency 
construction. Because the LegisJature empowered the Director to adopt administratjve rules, 
and specificalJy approved the "actual sales" rule, the Legislature has presumably acquiesced in 
his interpretation of the "actua1 sa1es" rul.e. Duncan, 232 P.3d at 326 (Because the Legislature 
empowered the Board of Accountancy to adopt professionaJ standards, the Legislature 
presumabJy acquiesced in the Board's interpretation of its conflicts rule). 
Third Rationale: Reliance on the agency's expertise in interpretation of the rule. 
It is beyond debate that the Director, and through him ISP's Bureau of Alcohol Beverage 
Control are relied upon by alcohol beverage Jicensees state-wide to help guide them through the 
often times confusing world of alcohol. beverage control statutes and rules, This reliance has 
been in place since 1947 when the Legislature first enacted a]cohol beverage control Jaws that 
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have tasked the Director of ISP with enforcement, licensing and administrative authority in this 
area. 1947 IDAHO SESS. LA ws CH. 274. 1 Al.coho! beverage control enforcement, licensing and 
aclrninistration are technical areas, and the Director, via his .Bureau of Alcohol Beverage Control, 
is the expert in this area. Accordingly, his decision should be given "considerable weight." See, 
e.g., Preston, 13 l Idaho at 506, 960 P.2d at 189 (The area of tax is a technical area, the [Tax] 
Commission is an expert in the area, so its decision should be given considerable weight.) 
Fourth Rationale: The rationale of repose. 
As pointed out in Duncan, "requiring affinnative disclosure by the accountant and assent 
by the cHent serves the rationale of repose, preventing a potential conflict from hangin.g over the 
parties' heads whiJe the accountant makes an attempt to ascertain whether the conflict was 
discovered and impliedly acquiesced in by the cJients." Duncan, 232 P.3d. at 326. Similarly, 
and as illustrated by the conflict in the present case, the Director's interpretation of the "actual 
sales" rule prevents further misunderstanding. And even though the Director expressly found 
Petitioner in violation of the rule, his decision further serves the rationale of repose insofar as he 
declined to app]y his interpretation to Petitioner, thus leaving Petitioner in possession of the 
liquor license and its corresponding privilege to engage in the business of selling liquor, a 
temporary pennit to do that which would otherwise be unlawful. (citations omitted)." Nampa 
Lodge No. JJ89 v. Smylie, 71 Idaho 212,229 P.2d 991 (1951). 
Fifth Rationale: The requirement of contemporaneous agency inte:mretation. 
As in Duncan, the fifth rationale is inapplicable in this matter because this case deals with 
an administrative rule promulgated by the Director rather than a statute adopted by the 
Legislature that needed to be interpreted by the Director. Duncan., 232 P.3d at 326 n. l. 
1 
In t 947, the Director of the ldaho State Police was called the Commissioner of Law Enforcement of the State of 
Jdaho. 
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Because four of the rational.es supporting the rule of deference are present in this case, 
there is no compelJing reason for the Court to depart from the Director's interpretation. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
Based on the foregoing, and because the Director's interpretatjon is reasonable, 
employing a rationale used by the Idaho Supreme Court, and no compelling reason is presented 
to depart from it, this Court should afford the Director the deference he is due and deny 
Petitioner's Petition for Judicial Review. 
DATED this 2 J day of January 2011. 
'J~AC!A..U/4 ./L1...;.-..,_) 
STEP~IEA.ALTJG 2:Y 
Lead Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION OF Duncan v. State Board of 
Accountancy, .149 Idaho 1,232 P.3d 322 (2010) was served on the following on this 2 i day of 
January 2011 by the following method: 
Brian Donesley 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 419 
Boise ID 83701-0419 
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner 
LJ U.S. First Class Mai], Postage Prepaid 
LJ U.S. Certified Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LJ Federal Express 
r_.1 Hand DeJivery 
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Stephanie A. Altig · 
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Post Office Box 419 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419 
Telephone (208) 343-3851 
Facsimile (208) 343-4188 
Attorney for AppeUant/Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DANIELS. FUCHS, Licensee, dba Case No. CV-2010-0005579 
AUBREY'S HOUSE OF ALE, 
Appellant/Petitioner, SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
v. 
IDAHO STATE POLICE, 
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
Respondent. 
Comes Now, Appellant/Petitioner Daniel S. Fuchs, by and through his attorney of 
record, Brian Donesley, and hereby submits the following Supplemental Briefin support 
of his Petition for Judicial Review. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Supplemental Brief is submitted by leave of Court granted, so the parties 
could discuss the application, if any, of Duncan v State Board of Accountancy, 149 Idaho 
1 (2010). Duncan, which analyzes· whether courts should give deference to an agency's 
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interpretation of its rules, is irrelevant to this case. Here, as described in Appellant 
Fuchs' Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review ("Appellant's Brief') and 
Appellant Fuchs' Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review, Idaho State 
Police ("ISP'') violated Idaho constitutional and statutory provisions and exceeded its 
statutory authority. Further, the Director's Final Order, was based upon unlawful 
procedure, was not supported by substantial evidence, and was arbitrary, capricious and 
abuse of discretion. The Director's Final Order should be overturned, on the statutory set 
forth in I.C. 67-5279 (3). This Court need not address the issue of deference of the 
agency's interpretation ofIDAPA l 1.05.01.010.03. 
If Duncan were found by this Court to apply, however, no deference should be 
given to the Director's Final Order, insofar as the Director construes the rule. The 
Director's construction ofIDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 was not reasonable. It departed from 
long-standing agency interpretation of the rule. And, it was reached only after ISP had 
pursued license revocation with no articulated legal standard to enforce. Further, no 
interpretation was necessary in the Final Order. The rule had treated the issue precisely. 
Actual sales was one way, but not the only way, that a new licensee could satisfy the 
"actual use" requirement ofl.C. 23.908 (4). Hence, as the rule treated the issue 
"precisely," as discussed in Duncan, no deference shall be given the Director's 
construction. 
This Court should disregard Duncan. It should award attorney fees to Fuchs 
pursuant to I.C. 12-117. 
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II. 
DUNCAN IS IRRELEVANT. IF DUNCAN WERE APPLICABLE, THE 
DIRECTOR'S FINAL ORDER WOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE. 
In Duncan, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a district court's decision affirming 
the ruling of the Idaho State Board of Accountancy. The Board had sanctioned Duncan 
for violating American Institute of Certified Public Accounts (AICPA) Rule 102.3 and 
Idaho Administrative Rule 01.01.01.004.001. Duncan, an accountant, had failed to 
disclose a conflict of interest. The district court affirmed the agency's decision. It held 
that the Board's fmdings were supported by substantial evidence. The Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the agency interpretation of its own rules was entitled to deference. 
Duncan's deference to agency interpretation of a rule is irrelevant here. In Fuchs' 
case, the Director's decision was not based upon substantial evidence, as the district court 
had found in Duncan. Furthermore, ISP, here, departed from its long-time interpretation 
of the rule, without notice to the public and the legislature, and without amending its 
rules lawfully. Accordingly, TSP's actions violated constitutional and statutory 
provisions. It exceeded statutory authority, was based upon unlawful procedure, was 
arbitrary, capricious and constituted abuse of discretion. I.C. 67-5279 (3). 
Again, a upractical" intel])letation ofIDAPA 11.05.01.010.03, as such tennis 
used in Duncan, previously existed. ISP had interpreted its rule for fifteen years not to 
require any number of actual sales of liquor. (Major Thomas Thompson Affidavit at 11f 
4-6) The Director acknowledged this in his Final Order, but he detemrlned that this prior 
agency interpretation was wrong. "Prior administrators, the Hearing Officer, and both 
parties misinterpreted what the rule requires." (Director's Final Order at 17). Yet, when 
ISP departed from prior agency interpretation and enforcement of the rule, it was required 
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by law to promulgate a new or amended rule, thereby announcing its new rule. Asarco, 
Inv. v. State, 138 Idaho 719 (2003). ISP did not lawfully change its rule. Rather, ISP 
filed its administrative complaint and sought nwocaLion without a legal standard to 
enforce.1 It was only after the Director declared the rule ambiguous in his Final Order, 
saying it could be interpreted three different ways, that he settled on his view that one (I) 
glass of liquor must be sold during each day a premises is open, eight (8) hours a day, six 
(6) days a week. Director's Final Order at 10-11. This ruling was without precedent 
before the agency and the public. Because the Director made a rule without following 
requirements of law, his rulemak.ing by fiat is not entitled to deforence. 
As the Duncan court explained, Idaho courts shall overturn an agency decision 
that "(a) violate[s] constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) exceed[s] the agency's 
statutory authority; (c) [is] made upon unlawful procedure; (d) [is] not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) [is] arbitrnry, t:apricious, or an abuse 
of discretion." Duncan, 149 Idaho at 3 (quoting Cooper v. Bd. Of Profl Di~cipline, 134 
Idaho 449, 454, (2000) (citing I.C. 67·5279 (3))). Each ground applies to this case: 
1. ISP's filing of its complaint and prolonged attempt to revoke Fuchs' 
license, without a legal standard to enforce, was an unreasonable exercise of police 
power, which violated Fuchs' fundamental rights of due process. Ibis violated 
constitutional and statutory provisions and exceeded the agency's statutory authority. 
See Appellant's Brief at 30-32. 
1 Duncan states that the "actions of an agency like the Board are afforded a strong presumption of validity.'' 
Duncan, 149 Idaho at 3 (emphasis added). ISP's pursuit ofrevocation without any clear legal standard is 
"agency action." See. J.C. 67-5201 (3). There should be no presumption of validity of the actions of a 
bureau within an agency that is acting in violation of law and contrary to lawful procedure. The actions of 
the bureau, despite the delegation of discretionary police power authority by the Director, itself suspect, 
much diminishes the deference due, if at all, under the Duncan analysis. · 
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2. ISP's departure from prior agency rules, without promulgating a new or 
amended rule, was infonnal rulemaking, contrary to the Idaho Administrative Procedures 
Act, I.C. 67-5201 et seq., and, thus, was based upon unlawful procedure. See Appellant's 
Brief at 27-30. 
3. The Director's Final Order was not based upon substantial evidence. 
Fuchs made actual sales of alcohol. No construction of the rule is required to which to 
grant deference. ru the evidence showed, contrary to statements in the Director's Final 
Order,2 Fuchs complied with the only legal standard for which he or the public had ever 
been given notice: no number of actual sales was required. ISP's new interpretation was 
inconsistent with the position upon which Fuch::; had detrimentally relied. See Appellant's 
Brief at 23-27. 
4. The Director's Final Order was arbitrary, capricious and abuse of 
discretion. Without notice, the Director departed from long-time agency interpretation. 
After declaring the rule ambiguous, he stated a new standard of how many actual sales 
were required over how many hours, days, weeks, and months for newly issued licenses. 
This was a new rule. No interpretation was to be done, hence no discretion involved. As 
to the old rule, there was no factual or legal. basis for his departure from longstanding 
agency interpretation. As there were no "adequate determining principles" behind bis 
new rule, any interpretation should be afforded no deference anyway. See Lane Ranch 
;i The Director incorporated the Heating Officer's recitation of these widisputcd facts into his Final Order. 
(Director's Final Order at 2). Even so, the Director made incorrect factual statements regarding the 
inconsistent statements made by !SP and Fuchs' reliance upon them. The Director stated that Fuchs had 
been infomied of a change in pofa::y when the contrary was true. !D ISP's practice with respect tc Fuchs' 
Nampa license, no number of actual sales was required. (Exhibit R-DF-(;). ISP Management Assistant, 
Denise Rogers, told him no mun.her of actual sales were requrred. (Rogers A_ffidavit at~ 4). Furt.her, Fuchs 
relied on ISP 's ·previous positions to bis detriment, leasing a premise, hiring an employee, obtaining 
permits and more. (Exhibit$ R-DF 9~15). · 
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Partnership v. City of Ketchum, 145 Idaho 87, 91 (2007). See also, Appellant's Brief at 
14-20. 
Even if this Court were to apply Duncan 's analysis, the Director's interpretation 
is not entitled to deference. In Duncan, the Court identified a four-prong test to 
detennine the appropriate level of deference: 
This Court must determine whether: (1) the agency is responsible for 
administration of the n.lle in issue; (2) the agency's construction is 
reasonable; (3) the language of the rule does not expressly treat the matter 
at issue; and ( 4) any of the rationales underlying the rule of agency 
deference are present 
Duncan, 149 Idaho at 3. 
While an agency is responsible for adrninistr.ttion of lhe rule, the Director's Final 
Order does not pass the second and third prongs of the test. The Director's construction 
was unreasonable. It was reached only after ISP sought to enforce an entirely different 
and patently unreasonable standard: multiple drinks per hour during eight (8) hours a day, 
six (6) days a week. (Deposition of Robert Clements at 35-36). Only after a full hearing 
and administrative appeal, at great cost to Fuchs, and the Director-s admission that the 
rule was ambiguous, did the Director finally settle on one ( 1) glass per day each day the 
establishment was open as bis rule, Director's Final Order at 11. Yet, even that 
construction would not be reasonable. Contrary to past ISP practice, the rule would 
require a new licensee to get patrons to buy drinks, something beyond a licensee's 
control. (See Gould Affidavit at 4). 
ISP's actions also fail the thirdproog of the te~t. The language ofthe rule 
expressly treated the matter at issue. IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.010.03 addresses the issue of 
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actual sales. It did not make such sales mandatory. (See Affidavits of Thompson, Goul~ 
and Rankin). 
As ISP' s actions do not meet the second and tbird prongs of the Duncan test, the 
Director's Final Order is entitled to no deference. Even if construction of the Director's 
post-agency action, his new rule, was proper, and not rulemaking, which it clearly was, 
Duncan does not apply. 
Ill. 
CONCLUSION 
Duncan does not apply to this case. If it were applicable, ISP did not satisfy 
Duncan 's four-prong test. This Court should award attorney fees to Fuchs pursuant to 
I.C. 12-117. 
DATED this 27 day of January, 2011. 
Brian Donesley 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27 day of January, 2011, I caused an accurate 
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Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General 
Stephanie A. Altig, Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridiau, Jdaho 83642-6202 
U.S. Mail: )( 
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CASE NO. CV2010-5579 
DECISION ON APPEAL 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE POLICE, 
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
Respondent. 
Brian Donesley, Attorney for Appellant. 
Stephanie A. Altig, Attorney for Respondent. 
The agency decision below, denying attorney fees to both parties, is AFFIRMED. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This matter is before the District Court on a Petition for Judicial Review pursuant to LC. 
§ 67-5201, et. seq., and I.R.C.P. 84. The appeal is from the June 8, 2010, Final Order by the 
Director of the Idaho State Police (ISP), denying Appellant's (Fuchs) Motion for Attorney Fees 
pursuant to LC. § 12-117. 
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Fuchs was issued an Idaho Retail Alcohol Beverage License on June 6, 2008, and Fuchs 
leased space at 2065 West Riverstone Drive, #207, in Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai County, Idaho. 
This premise was named Aubrey's House of Ale (Aubrey's), and was open for business Monday 
thru Saturday, from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 
On September 16, 2008, Lt. Clements, Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC) Bureau Chief, 
conducted an unannounced inspection of Aubrey's. Lt. Clements met with Ruth Purvis, Fuchs' 
employee, but observed no customers. Ms. Purvis showed Lt. Clements the liquor and beer supply 
which was available. 
Fuchs produced for Lt. Clements copies of Aubrey's sales records from June, 2008 thru 
September, 2008. Those records indicated sales for each month Aubrey's had been open. ABC 
filed a Complaint for Forfeiture or Revocation of Retail Alcohol Beverage License. The parties 
filed cross motions for summary judgment on October 9, 2009. Upon oral argument, the Hearing 
Officer issued a Preliminary Order on December 24, 2009, granting summary judgment to Fuchs. 
The Hearing Officer found that IDAPA Rule 11.05.01.010.03, the controlling rule at issue, 
unambiguously required a new licensee to make actual sales of liquor by the drink sometime while 
in operation for eight (8) hours per day and no fewer than six (6) days per week. The further 
finding was that Fuchs and Aubrey's had met that requirement. 
ABC appealed the Hearing Officer's decision to the Director of the Idaho State Police. On 
June 8, 2010, the Director issued his Final Order, declaring that Rule 10.03 was ambiguous, and 
that the actual requirement for Rule 10.03 was for the new licensee to sell at least one (1) glass of 
liquor sometime during every day that the establishment is open as required by law. The Final 
Order found that Fuchs had not met that requirement, but did not order revocation for forfeiture of 
the license because of the confusion over the proper interpretation of the rule. The Director denied 
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attorney fees to both parties, stating that neither party was prevailing and that Fuchs had not acted 
without a reasonable basis in law. 
Fuchs filed his Notice of Appeal/Petition for Judicial Review with this Court on July 1, 
2010, seeking costs and attorney fees. Memoranda in support of and in opposition to Fuchs' appeal 
were filed with this Court, and oral argument was heard on January 5, 2011. At oral argument, 
counsel for Respondent cited the case of Duncan v. State Board of Accountancy, 149 Idaho 1,232 
P.3d 322 (2010), a case not previously cited by either party in their briefing. This Court allowed 
both sides to submit additional legal analysis of that case. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Fuchs argues that the Court should overrule the Director's denial of costs and attorney fees, 
and order costs and attorney fees to Fuchs under J.C. § 12-117, on the basis that Fuchs was the 
prevailing party and ABC unreasonably brought the forfeiture/revocation action. 
Fuchs exhaustively analyzes and argues LC. 67-5279(3), the five findings upon which a 
reviewing court can set aside an agency action. This Court determines that it need not make 
findings or conclusions on the five criteria of LC. § 67-5279(3); this determination is based on LC. 
§ 67-5279(4), which provides that an agency action shall be affirmed unless the substantial rights of 
the appellant have been prejudiced. See Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 
87, 175 P.3d 776 (2007). Fuchs has failed to persuade this Court that costs and attorney fees are a 
substantial right contemplated by the statute. Fuchs was not, in fact, sanctioned by the Director in 
his Final Order, and no substantial right of his has been denied. 
The real analysis for this Court is found in the plain language of J.C. § 12-117, the statutory 
basis under which Fuchs seek costs and fees below. 
LC. § 12-117 provides for the award ofreasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing 
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party, if it is also found that the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The Director below, as previously stated, denied attorney fees to both parties on the basis 
that neither party was prevailing. This was a reasonable view of the proceedings by the Director 
given that Fuchs was found to have violated the requirements of a new licensee, but no sanctions 
were levied against Fuchs. This was also a discretionary call by the Director, and there is nothing in 
the record to support an argument that the Director abused his discretion. The record supports the 
conclusion that the Director viewed this decision as discretionary, acted within the perimeters of 
that discretion and acted in a reasonable manner. 
In the absence of a finding of a prevailing party, the Director did not need to determine 
whether the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Director below properly exercised his discretion in finding that neither party prevailed 
for purposes of an attorney fees request pursuant to LC. § 12-117. It was, therefore, proper for the 
Director to not award fees and costs to either party. The decision of the Director below is 
AFFIRMED. 
~ 
DATED this l O -day of February, 201 I. 
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BRIAN DONESLEY ISB#2313 
Attorney at Law 
548 North Avenue H 
Post Office Box 419 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0419 
Telephone (208) 343-3851 
Facsimile (208) 343-4188 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
DANIELS. FUCHS, Licensee, dba 
AUBREY'S HOUSE OF ALE, 
Case No. CV-2010-0005579 
AppeJlant/Petitioner, NOTICE OF APPEAL 
v. 
IDAHO STATE POLICE, 
ALCOHOL BEVERAGE CONTROL, 
Respondent. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, ITS ATTORNEYS, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Daniel S. Fuchs, Licensee, dba Aubrey's House 
of Ale, appeals against the above-named Respondent, Idaho State Police, Bureau of 
Alcohol Beverage Control, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision on Appeal 
entered in the above entitled action on the 10th day of February, 2011, the Honorable 
Lansing L. Haynes, District Judge, presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Daniel Fuchs vs ISP SC 38714-2011 
2. Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the decision 
described in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (2) and (f) 
LA.R. 
3. This appeal is based upon the June 8, 2010 Director's Final Order issued by 
the Director of the Idaho State Police, dismissing the Petition for Review filed by 
Complainant Idaho State Police, Alcohol Beverage Control Bureau, from the Preliminary 
Order issued by the Hearing Officer granting summary judgment to Appellant. The 
Director ruled that Appellant would not be sanctioned, despite finding that Appellant had 
violated a rule, finding, incongruously, that the agency rule involved in the action was 
ambiguous, as had been contended by Appellant from the beginning of the administrative 
license revocation action. The Director denied Appellant's Motion for Attorney Fees 
pursuant to LC. § 12-117, stating that (1) neither party had prevailed and (2) that 
Appellant Fuchs had not acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The Director's Final Order was affirmed by the District Court, holding that costs 
and attorney fees are not a "substantial right" contemplated by LC.§ 67-5279 (4) and that 
the Director properly had exercised his discretion when he held that neither party 
prevailed. 
The following issues arise from the Decision on Appeal: 
A. Whether Appellant's "substantial rights," as contemplated by LC. § 67-
5279 ( 4 ), were prejudiced; 
B. Whether Appellant was a "prevailing party," entitling him to seek attorney 
fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-117; 
C. Whether Respondent's actions were without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law, based on the following grounds: 
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i. Respondent departed from longstanding agency practice and filed 
the administrative action for revocation without first promulgating a new or amended rule 
notifying new licensees as to how many "actual sales" would be required; 
ii. Respondent was barred from enforcing inconsistent positions 
under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel; 
111. Respondent's attempt to revoke Appellant's license, based upon a 
legal standard only announced by the Director in his Final Order, without first 
promulgating a new or amended rule stating how many "actual sales" were required, was 
an unreasonable exercise of police power. 
D. The District Court erred in applying an overbroad, discretionary standard 
to the Director's quasi-judicial function in finding the Director's discretion excused the 
denial of Appellant's "substantial rights" to costs and attorney's fees, due process oflaw, 
and freedom from the unreasonable exercise of police power. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. (a) Appellant requests the reporter's transcript to be prepared in hard copy and 
electronic format for the following proceedings: 
January 5, 2011: Hearing of Oral Argument on Appeal. 
6. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record, in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R: 
A. Brief of Appellant in Support of Petition for Review, filed on 
October 15, 2010; 
B. Respondent's Brief in Opposition for Judicial Review, filed on 
November 8, 2010; 
C. Appellant Fuchs' Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Review, 
filed on November 26, 2010; 
D. Respondent's Memorandum of Law in Support of Application of 
Duncan v. State Board of Accountancy, filed on January 27, 2011; and, 
.E. Suppiemental Brief (Appellant), fiied on January 27, 2011. 
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7. Appellant requests the following additional documents, charts or pictures 
offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court 
Agency Record, filed in the District Court on August 18, 20 I 0. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested, as named below, at each address set out below; 
(b) (1) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
( c) (I) That the estimated fee for the preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid. 
( d) (I) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required served pursuant to 
Rule 20 (and the Attorney General ofldaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho 
Code). 
DATED this _E_ day of March 2011. ') 
( 1.~ ~--
Brian Donesley 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the <o day of March, 2011, I caused an accurate 
copy of the foregoing document to be delivered as noted below to: 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General 
Stephanie A. Altig, Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Police 
700 S. Stratford Drive 
Meridian, Idaho 83642-6202 
Byrl Cinnamon 
Official Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 2821 
Hayden, ID 83835 
U.S. Mail: 






Hand Delivery: ______ _ 
Facsimile: 
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Barbi McCary Crowell 
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I, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled 
cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the 
pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
lfurther certify that there are exhibits, which are part of the clerk's record. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant/Petitioner and Defendant's Respondent were notified that 
the Clerk's Record was complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies 
were mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid on the __ day of _____ , 2011. 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court . 
. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai County 
Idaho this __ day ___ _, 2011. 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: __________ _ 
Deputy Clerk 
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